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A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in 
our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably. 
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Opening case 
A Wednesday morning in a local hospital in Norway, and I was eagerly awaiting the 
weekly teaching session. Being a medical student, these sessions were always 
welcomed, but I was especially eager on this particular occasion because the theme 
was to be “Do-Not-Resuscitate orders”. Since I had studied philosophical bioethics at 
university, I had a special interest in the topic and was looking forward to listening to 
the experienced doctors’ moral deliberations. What is more, this might even be a time 
to make a thoughtful contribution myself, since I was familiar with the philosophical 
debate on this issue. The senior consultant explained at length what a “DNR-order” 
was and the kind of medical interventions it normally covered, stressing the need to 
assess the patient’s prognosis, likelihood of successful treatment and risk of 
complications. He further described how to record a “DNR-order” and set out the 
details of the health care personnel who were authorised to do so. In fact, for a full 
hour, the consultant and the other doctors from this medical department talked about 
the “DNR-order” – a procedure describing when to not give patients life-sustaining 
treatment – without ever mentioning a moral issue. I was extremely perplexed by this 
experience, and what was even worse was that during this hour I could not think of a 
single moral question to pose that seemed relevant. In the time that passed after that 
teaching session, I could not seem to get a puzzling question out of my head: where 
did the ethics go? 
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English summary 
All of clinical work also has a moral dimension since the purpose of clinical medicine 
is to help patients. The aim of this project is to understand how doctors deal with 
these moral dimensions of clinical work. The field of bioethics has largely emerged 
as a philosophically founded discipline, without taking into account how doctors 
already handle moral values as a tacit or implicit part of their clinical work. This has 
caused a gap between medical ethics and medical practice. 
 
This research contains data from two qualitative studies: observations and interviews 
with 17 general practitioners and hospital doctors, and observations of 101 video 
recorded patient consultations in hospital. The doctors focused exclusively on 
medical issues in the encounters, even if their patient’s worries could be related to 
more personal parts of the patient’s life, such as fear of loosing one’s job. Patients’ 
personal worries were systematically ignored by the doctors. In order to help their 
patients by the use of their biomedical knowledge of anatomy and bodily processes, 
the doctors often handled their patients as objects. However, for patients it is morally 
offensive to be rejected and treated as medical objects, and it might feel very 
unpleasant. The doctors, who often kept a good tone in the consultations, did not 
appear to recognise their concurrent moral offence. Our research suggests that these 
moral infringements might be unavoidable in medical work, but that doctors, 
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Norsk sammendrag 
Ettersom målet med klinisk medisin er å hjelpe pasientene, har alt medisinsk arbeid 
også en moralsk side, og hensikten med prosjektet er å synliggjøre legers håndtering 
av de moralske sidene av klinisk arbeid. Faget medisinsk etikk har i stor grad vokst 
fram som en filosofisk fundert disiplin uten å ta høyde for hvordan legene allerede 
håndterer moralske verdier, nettopp fordi det er en underforstått og usynlig del av 
klinisk arbeid. Dette har skapt et gap mellom medisinsk etikk og medisin i praksis. 
 
Datamaterialet er hentet fra to kvalitative studier; en med observasjoner og intervju 
med 17 leger fra allmennpraksis og sykehus og en med observasjon av 101 
videoopptak av lege-pasient konsultasjoner på sykehus. I møtet med pasientene 
fokuserte legene utelukkende på medisinske forhold selv om pasientens bekymring 
kunne være knyttet til mer personlige deler av pasientens liv, som frykt for å miste 
jobben. Pasientenes personlige bekymringer ble systematisk oversett av legene. For å 
bruke sin biomedisinske kunnskap om anatomi og organfunksjoner til å hjelpe 
pasientene, forholdt legene seg ofte til pasientene som objekter. For pasienter 
innebærer det imidlertid et moralsk overtramp å bli avvist og behandlet som objekt, 
og kan oppleves ubehagelig. Det virket som om legene, fordi de samtidig ofte var 
vennlige, ikke oppfattet overtrampet. Studien antyder at slike moralske krenkelser er 
uunngåelig i medisinsk arbeid, men at legene bør være klar over ubehaget det kan 
medføre og hvordan de kan minske det. 
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1. Preliminaries 
1.1.  Introduction 
1.1.1. Outline of the thesis 
The composition of this thesis is kept within the logic of the research project in such 
a way that the presentation follows the structure of the research process. This means 
that any significant, theoretical introduction or definitions of relevant concepts has 
been omitted on purpose. When conducting research based on Grounded Theory 
methodology, it is important to not define the theories or concepts that are central to 
your field of study in advance. The reason for this is that you cannot know what 
theories or concepts will be significant to your findings until you have actually 
carried out your research. In writing this thesis, there was of course a possibility to 
anticipate the course of events and consequently add the relevant theoretical concepts 
to the introduction, even though we did not investigate these until completion of the 
studies contained herein. However, to make the research process as transparent as 
possible, the work is presented in approximately the order in which it occurred. I 
have tried to emphasise this transparency throughout the dissertation so that readers 
can assess the results and conclusions on the basis of the reflections and choices 
made during the research process. This opportunity to scrutinise the research is an 
important source of this work’s internal validity, and this is discussed further in the 
“study limitations” section. 
 
First, I will explain the background for this project, that is, my thoughts and 
reflections on the field before initiating the studies and, consequently, the aim of the 
research. I will provide a brief introduction to the history of medical ethics and the 
philosophical diversity of the field, as well as give some illustrations of empirical 
studies conducted in the field. Next, I move on to the methodological considerations. 
In this latter section, my aim is to present the Grounded Theory method, our reasons 
for choosing it and the consequences that this decision has had on how the research 
was conducted. I will only cover the methodological considerations in principle in 
this part of the dissertation, while the more practical implementation issues are 
presented along with the individual studies. This seems to be the most appropriate 
approach, since the actual prosecution of each of the studies varied considerably. 
These studies are then presented in the order in which they were conducted, and some 
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of the theoretical reflections we undertook during the process are also dealt with. This 
mode of presentation has been chosen to reflect how the research developed, with all 
of its different steps and various considerations. According to the methodology, the 
researcher must be open to the results that emerge from the study and let the research 
be guided by what is found. Consequently, the progress of the research is an 
important part of the method, and it is only by revealing this progress that our 
research can be presented in a truthful manner. 
 
Following the presentation of the three studies, I describe the main findings in 
relation to our research aim. Subsequently, in the discussion, I will try to 
contextualise our findings in light of our results and the related theoretical 
considerations. In other words, I will attempt to place the research in its proper 
context, which was not really known beforehand. In Grounded Theory research, the 
relevant context is not defined by the research field, but instead by the theoretical 
concepts that we explore in our findings. This is the reason why the theoretical 
position is not established until the final section of the thesis. In this case, I will build 
upon the theories of ethics, as well as using ongoing discussions in philosophy and 
sociology and other related empirical research to both demonstrate the contribution 
made by our work and also demarcate its scope. Next, I attempt to critically evaluate 
our findings, both according to Grounded Theory standards and more general criteria 
for qualitative research. In particular, I review the validity of the studies and the 
limitations of our work, as well as the consequences thereof. Finally, in the 
conclusion, I will underline some of the consequences identified from the results and 
discuss how they point to possible new areas of research. 
 
1.1.2. Background 
If you follow a doctor around a hospital on a working day, it is very rare to ever hear 
him or her mentioning an ethical dilemma or a moral value. Instead, cases are 
understood, analysed and discussed in medical terms, such as a patient’s prognosis, 
the probability of a favourable outcome and possible complications. Some 
researchers have suggested that doctors cover their reasoning in medical terms to 
avoid ethical justifications (Sayers & Perera, 2002); others have proposed that 
doctors have poor moral perception (Casarett, 1999). In his doctoral thesis, Terje 
Mesel found a discrepancy between the normative ground of the medical profession 
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and the moral reflections of the interviewed doctors (2009). He suggests that 
professional codes of ethics are often considered alien to daily practical work. While 
the field of medical ethics is growing, it is more grounded in the tradition of moral 
philosophy than that of medicine. Most of the scientific articles on the topic are 
confined to specialist journals dedicated to issues of ethics and philosophy, and do 
not, therefore, come to the attention of the majority of clinical doctors. The 
introduction of medical school courses devoted to medical ethics may be taken as a 
sign of progress when it comes to appreciating ethics in medicine, but these classes 
are sometimes characterised as poorly integrated in the rest of the curriculum 
(Coulehan & Williams, 2003; Loewy, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, doctors are not insensitive to moral issues. On the contrary, they often 
set high moral standards for their work, and being “a good doctor” is a powerful ideal 
for most of those engaged in clinical practice (see for instance BMJ’s special issue 
“What's a good doctor and how do you make one?”, 2002). Indeed, the medical 
profession has long-standing moral traditions, some of which stem from the 
Hippocratic Oath from 500 BC. The traditional aphorism “To cure sometimes, to 
relieve often, to comfort always – this is our work” is also the symbol of good clinical 
practice today (Strauss, 1968), and is incorporated in the first article of the 
Norwegian Medical Association’s Code of Ethics (Legeforeningen, 2011).  
Moreover, the aims of a good clinician are normally perceived to include practical 
human knowledge and empathy, while relieving suffering and helping patients is seen 
as central to the role of the medical profession. 
 
This leads us, however, to a paradox which reflects my puzzling experience referred 
to in the opening case: the field of medicine has evident moral dimensions, and yet 
they are barely visible in practice. It is difficult to see the relevance of the principle of 
justice or the value of autonomous choice when you are examining a middle-aged 
woman for sub-acute abdominal pain. Somehow then, it seems as if the norms and 
values of medical ethics do not fit properly with medical reality. One reason for this 
might be that the field of medical ethics has, above all, concentrated more on the big 
and controversial issues in medicine, like abortion, euthanasia and genetic 
technology, and less on the field of everyday medical practice, which occupies most 
doctors’ working life. As a result, the focus of medical ethics may well not be 
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relevant for most doctors. This lacuna could also be interpreted as a universal gap 
between theory and practical work, which exists in many different fields. There is a 
divergence between theoretical knowledge of how to do the work and a practical 
understanding of how to actually perform it, referring to an age-old distinction made 
by Aristotle (1980). Abstract ideas can be difficult to transfer to the nitty-gritty of 
everyday practice, and this could be the reason why practicing medics find ethical 
theory so difficult to apply. Yet doctors are certainly used to relating their practical 
work on individuals to theoretical models and abstract concepts, since medical 
practice is firmly built on scientific medical theory. While it is often difficult when 
dealing with a patient to determine how one’s general knowledge of medical theory 
applies to this particular case, problems with medical ethics seem to be of a different 
nature altogether. 
 
Some empirical studies have indicated that the principles of medical ethics are not 
wholly internalised in the medical profession, and that doctors instead feel alienated 
by the language of bioethics (Davies & Hudson, 1999; Karnieli-Miller & Eisikovits, 
2009). Doctors rarely articulate moral judgements in their daily practice. Yet, rather 
than interpreting this as a lack of moral understanding, it could be that medical 
language and clinical practice are “morally loaded”; in other words, the moral 
dimension is always implicit in the medical judgements that doctors make in a way 
that means that it is superfluous to refer to a moral principle. Some studies have 
mentioned the concept of responsibility as being an important notion with which to 
understand doctors’ perceptions of morality in medical practice, yet this is not a 
concept that is much used in the medical ethics’ literature. Søren Holm, a medical 
doctor and philosopher, and Reet Arnman, an experienced doctor, have both 
interviewed health care personnel, and describe the discrepancy between bioethical 
concepts and the practical reasoning of doctors (Holm, 1997; Arnman, 2004). Holm 
came up with the notion of “protective responsibility”, which he argues is a better 
description of what health care personnel perceive to be morally significant. Arnman 
also emphasises how doctors’ moral experiences deviate from medical ethics 
discourse. “The doctors did not talk like moral agents with dilemmas (…) they spoke 
like moral persons with bad consciousnesses” (Arnman, 2004, p. 85). This leads 
Arnman to conclude that doctors’ perceptions of ethics are closely related to their 
experiences of professional responsibility. 
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The discourse of medical ethics does not seem to reflect doctors’ own moral 
experiences, making it difficult for them to relate to its moral demands. Moreover, 
the ethical dimensions of doctors’ current medical practices remain tacit and, as such, 
hidden from moral enquiry. 
 
1.1.3. Research aim 
What initially led me to this project was the persistent and perplexing impression that 
medical ethics did not “fit” into clinical practice. My theoretical knowledge of the 
topic and my incipient practical knowledge of health care somehow seemed to take 
place in two parallel dimensions, with neither of these being concerned with the other 
or even compatible. Discussions in medical ethics often focus on principles and ideals 
that do not seem to be relevant in daily clinical work. Yet, at the same time, the field 
of medical ethics does not appear to address the most pressing concerns of practicing 
doctors, like how to decide if this patient is too old and fragile for an important 
surgical operation or how to cope with angry relatives who distrust any of your 
medical interventions. In other words, the ideals of medical ethics seem to fall short 
of the real challenges of clinical practice. 
 
Certainly, this is one way of defining the problem. You could, however, begin with 
the same premises and conclude that doctors fall short when it comes to exercising 
medical ethics. Indeed, there might be nothing wrong with the concepts of medical 
ethics if only intractable doctors could comply with their demands. Variations of this 
conception of medical practice seem to flourish in the medical ethics’ literature. All 
too often, when discussing why doctors do not seem to respect patient autonomy or 
provide paternalistic support, the proposed solution is to change doctors’ attitudes 
and behaviour (Corke et al., 2005; Braddock et al., 1999). However, this sounds like 
an easy way out, because it does not examine why doctors appear to act contrary to 
stated ethical obligations. For this reason we have chosen to adopt another approach 
to the problem, instead asking why the expanding field of medical ethics does not 
seem to concern doctors in any significant way. 
 
From this angle, the problem seems to be related to the premises of medical practice, 
which, being understood as helping patients and relieving their suffering, must be 
abundant with moral actions. Even if doctors do not talk of their actions and decisions 
 14
Kari Milch Agledahl  Morally bound medical work 
in terms of values, these values must nonetheless be present in medical practice. 
Doctors seem to deal with these values in quite an implicit manner, relating to them 
through their practical work rather than expressing them as moral acts or decisions. 
Indeed, doctors’ approaches to moral values seem largely to be imbedded in their 
clinical work. If this is in fact the case, the challenge would be to gain an 
understanding of doctors’ implicit handling of moral values, since this knowledge 
may throw light on practitioners’ moral inducements and, perhaps, even identify the 
missing link to medical ethics. 
 
We did not know in advance what these values would be or how the doctors dealt 
with them, and so we could not formulate the research questions in any detailed 
manner. Moreover, an open approach is essential when using the Grounded Theory 
method that we chose to employ herein, and this approach will be explained in detail 
later. Nonetheless, we had a clear interest in conducting the present studies: Our 
fundamental aim was to explore the unspoken dimension of medical practice that 
involves moral values. Accordingly, for each study, we have addressed different 
aspects of this dimension. 
 
1.1.4. Tacit knowledge 
The concept of tacit knowledge has taken root in everyday speech, yet it has a whole 
spectre of meanings. Since the aim of this project is to expose the values in clinical 
practice that are implicit or tacit, it is important to clarify what the concept means. 
The term “tacit knowledge” is commonly thought to originate from Polanyi, but its 
use has also been heavily influenced by Wittgenstein. Strictly speaking, Polanyi 
mainly speaks of “tacit knowing”, which refers to the function or use of tacit 
knowledge. However, for our purposes this distinction is not central, and I will 
therefore stick to the term tacit knowledge, which is the concept that is most 
commonly used today.  
 
A central premise of tacit knowledge is that “we know more than we can express” 
(Polanyi, 1967). Human language does not exhaust our experiences. The image of an 
iceberg is an often-used metaphor, where our explicit knowledge forms the top of the 
iceberg that is floating above surface, while the part that remains under water 
represents our tacit knowledge. Polanyi provides several arguments in favour of the 
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existence of tacit knowledge (Rolf, 1991): First of all, human language is not refined 
enough to cover all of the complexities of reality, and so it cannot capture all of our 
knowledge; we are often able to grasp more nuances of a particular situation than we 
are able to articulate. Moreover, the system of language is a common tool that each of 
us masters to a varying degree, meaning that it contains both more and less explicit 
knowledge than each individual possesses. Furthermore, he argues that the 
vocabulary is constantly changing, especially when it comes to the progress of new 
sciences, technologies and professions, which seem to develop faster than the 
language in each field. Finally, learning how to speak a language means that you are 
dependent upon knowledge that is not in itself in a linguistic form. In other words, 
our understanding of how vocal sounds (or written symbols) relate to the world 
around us cannot rely on a form of knowledge that is contained within the language. 
 
Even though the existence of tacit knowledge seems plausible, what is not apparent is 
the kind of knowledge that this is. A central issue is whether tacit knowledge can ever 
be explicit. Wittgenstein speaks of the parts of knowledge that are inexpressible; that 
is, they cannot be expressed in language (Wittgenstein, 1967). He also claims that 
many of the existential aspects of human life cannot be made explicit, although our 
use of language can point towards them. It is here that Polanyi’s concept of tacit 
knowledge differs from that of Wittgenstein in that the former asserts that all tacit 
knowledge could, in principle, be made explicit; while language is too rudimentary to 
capture the complexity of human experience and knowledge, there is no specific 
element of this tacit knowledge that could never be articulated. 
 
For Polanyi, tacit knowledge functions as a kind of mental and sensorial tool that 
supports our intended actions, making a necessary background for all of our 
expressed knowledge. When you are driving a car, your focus is on the road and the 
traffic, but at the same time you are feeling the acceleration, listening for the rpm, 
using the clutch and changing gears almost automatically. Although you had to focus 
on these latter tasks when you were learning how to drive, the management of the 
car’s tools has now become tacit knowledge if you are an experienced motorist. You 
would be aware of these tacit elements if you choose to, for instance, focus on the 
gears, but they are normally used tacitly. According to Polanyi, tacit knowledge is 
thus knowledge that is in the background and is not our prime focus. It is a 
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prerequisite for expressed knowledge. The kind of tacit knowledge involved in 
medical practice can also be related to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ notion of expert 
knowledge. In contrast to lower stages of competence, which depend on rules or 
guidelines, they maintain that practical expertise is marked by intuition and a general 
grasp of a situation, rather than being able to articulate the reasons for the response 
(Dreyfus et al., 1986). 
 
In this research, when aiming for the implicit moral values of clinical practice, we 
relate the concept of implicit values to Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge. We seek 
to focus on the elements of medical practice that are not articulated, but still form the 
basis for most doctors’ actions. More specifically, our focus is on hidden values, 
which are intended to refer to the tacit dimensions of value-laden decisions and 
actions. There is, however, an intrinsic challenge in the effort to study a tacit 
phenomenon, even if we presume that tacit values do not have to remain unspoken. 
Many researchers question the possibility of converting tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge (Haldin-Herrgård, 2005). This does not mean that studies of tacit 
phenomena are futile, but that the tacit knowledge subsists as such, while the studies 
might create new, explicit knowledge about the phenomenon. With reference to 
Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge, we will try to bring the background knowledge 
of doctors into focus by systematically collecting, analysing and reflecting upon 
empirical data from doctors’ clinical work. It may not be possible to articulate the 
doctors’ underlying values, as in completing a list of biomedical principles. Still, we 
aim for an explicit reflection on this moral dimension and how it influences medical 
practice, which will hopefully contribute to our knowledge of the values embedded in 
clinical work. 
 
1.2. Medical ethics 
Before entering the field of medical ethics, a comment on the distinction between the 
concepts of “morality” and “ethics” is perhaps due. Although they have no precise 
definition in philosophical discourse, “morality” and “moral” is more often used in 
relation to concrete actions. “Ethics” and “ethical” generally refers to a more 
theoretical reflection on an action; it is often used when describing the rationale and 
motivation behind an action or referring to a philosophical system of values. Morality 
is what you do; ethics is your reasons for doing so. Although this distinction is 
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generally reflected in my thesis, I might not always be consistent because the 
concepts are often used interchangeably in everyday speech. 
 
1.2.1. Establishing a field of medical ethics 
Medical ethics is a field that is marked by a moral plurality, which arises from how 
and why the discipline was first established in the United States in the late 1960s 
(Jonsen, 1998). The advance of medical ethics as a discipline was occasioned by a 
remarkable development in the field of medical technology, which created new 
problems that required new answers. In addition, the public had been shocked by the 
disclosure of brutal abuses in the name of medical research, with well-known cases 
being the Nazi experimentation during World War II (Lifton, 1986) and the Tuskegee 
syphilis experiments in the United States (Jones, 1981). A growing consciousness 
among medical professionals and the general public of the moral perils of modern 
medical progress required experts from different professions to address these new 
issues. Medical ethics thus arose from a conglomerate of professions, which was 
dominated by philosophers, theologians and jurists. Accordingly, the birth of medical 
ethics as a discipline was not driven by doctors, but instead by forces that wanted to 
draw attention to doctors’ self-governing moral judgements. What emerged was a 
corrective to doctors’ professional practices. As a consequence, for many of these 
practitioners, the field of medical ethics developed as an external and redundant 
instruction, which was just one more attempt to deprive the profession of power and 
autonomy.  
 
The field of medical ethics cannot really be seen as a continuation of doctors’ 
professional ethics, but rather as a new discipline that is in addition to, and often in 
conflict with, doctors’ traditional moral discourse. The American term for this new 
field was “bioethics”, which distinguished it from traditional medical discourse 
within the medical profession while also encompassing the new issues of biological 
and technological advances. In Europe, the term “medical ethics” is frequently used 
for this new discipline, which implies a primary focus on the field of health care that 
is often even further restricted to mean reflections on the specific moral duties of 
doctors. In many European languages, the term bioethics aroused certain negative 
connotations with biotechnology and the biological foundations of ethics, but it is 
now also widely accepted in Europe and used to represent the distinct discourse and 
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range of issues that are modern medical ethics. The terms bioethics, medical ethics 
and sometimes even biomedical ethics are often used rather interchangeably, 
especially in European discourse. However, bioethics in its strictest sense covers a 
wider field of biotechnology and “all living organisms”, meaning that medical ethics 
can be seen as a branch of bioethics that concerns itself with the moral aspects of 
health care and doctors’ professional moral duties. It is this narrow definition of 
medical ethics to which I refer when using the word in this dissertation. Indeed, I 
deliberately limit my discussion of the wider issue of biology, while also confirming 
that my thinking stands in a European tradition which, when it comes to expressed 
challenges and theoretical foundations, may well diverge to some extent from 
American discourse. 
 
The fact that the discipline of medical ethics took its form from outside the medical 
profession has probably played a part in alienating doctors from a field that had 
traditionally been their own. This meant that the discipline of philosophy typically 
got to define bioethics, basing it on philosophical concepts and ethical theories, with 
the result being that health care personnel were displaced from any key position when 
it came to the development of the field. Yet, it would certainly be wrong to suggest 
that doctors disregarded ethical considerations. A traditional understanding of 
professional virtues and codes of ethics remained within the medical profession. 
Several doctors raised concerns about questionable medical and research practice, 
and worked for a development of doctors’ professional moral conduct. The 
Declaration of Helsinki is an example of this work, which was driven by the World 
Medical Association (2011). The Declaration establishes an ethical standard for 
medical research, leaning heavily upon the Nuremberg Code (National Institutes of 
Health, 2011). An important reason for the medical profession to engage in ethical 
discussion has been the need to protect its autonomous status. It is generally believed 
to be a vital asset for any profession that it is able to execute some form of control 
over its members (Grimen, 2008). As the field of bioethics developed, the medical 
profession also saw it as important to prevent the legal system from taking over large 
parts of the medical domain. Indeed, in the United States, there was a growing 
tendency to take difficult medical cases to court instead of dealing with them within 
the medical context. The legal discussions would then often influence the bioethical 
discourse, meaning that the law and bioethics, particularly in the United States, have 
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developed hand in hand (Jonsen, 1998, p. 342). As a consequence, central concepts of 
American law now have essential positions in bioethics, with the first among these 
being the right to self-determination. The case-to-case analysis and procedural 
reasoning commonly used in bioethical discourse probably also stems from the 
practice of law. The intrusion of non-medical personnel into the realms of medicine 
has been eloquently described by Rothman in his book “Strangers at the Bedside: A 
History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making” (1991). 
Rothman also emphasises doctors’ ambiguous attitudes towards bioethics; although it 
was often doctors who informed the public about dubious medical practices, at the 
same time they were concerned about a loss of professional autonomy. 
 
Since philosophers and jurists had defined the concepts and relevant questions in 
medical ethics, there was a growing tendency to separate the ethical and medical 
aspects of clinical cases, with doctors largely withdrawing to their own uncontested 
field: clinical medicine. This development is important in enabling us to understand 
both why bioethics has continued to be a discipline that exists outside the medical 
profession and why there is some resistance to medical ethics discourse among 
doctors. 
 
1.2.2. Development of ethics in medicine 
Other social forces have probably contributed to the development of ethics in 
medicine. While being a doctor used to be a mission in life, or at least a profession 
that defined an individual in society, it has gradually become a more ordinary 
occupation. Nowadays, being a doctor has to fit in with the rest of your life, including 
your family and leisure pursuits, and is perhaps driven less by a sense of duty towards 
potential patients or humanity. These changes are not unique to medicine; we are less 
likely to regard a job as a doctor, dentist or lawyer as a personal calling. It is likely 
that these sociological changes have also had an impact on professional ethics, 
reducing awareness of the common moral duties of a particular profession. 
 
Other changes from within medicine itself have also seemed to play an important part 
in the development of medical ethics as a field outside the medical profession. 
Medicine has undergone significant changes ever since the Age of Enlightenment, 
with the more spiritual dimensions largely disappearing and the scientific ideal 
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becoming the central model for medical knowledge. Modern medicine is built on a 
thorough understanding of human anatomy and physiology, even down to the cell and 
atom level, and being able to analyse the human body as a finely tuned mechanical 
instrument has proved to be an efficient approach that has led to ever new medical 
discoveries. Along with, and as an effect of, this development, medicine is guided by 
ever more technical instruments. Meanwhile, the profession today has become highly 
specialised, needing not only expert medics in specialist fields, but also expert 
technical personnel who are capable of handling technologically advanced tests. 
 
Does this seemingly neutral and scientific development of medicine have any moral 
consequences? Probably not, in the sense that it has not changed the underlying goals 
of medicine: doctors still try to heal or help their patients. Yet, just as the field of 
scientific medicine undergoes substantial changes, so do the practice of clinical 
medicine and the approach of doctors to patients. The discipline of ethics relates to 
the appreciation of what it means to be a human being. When each body part and 
function of an organ are analysed as detached elements of a mechanical body, the 
moral aspects of a patient encounter are easily shattered. How much moral value can 
you ascribe to a finger, a blood vessel or a kidney? Moral dimensions are thus 
deprived of meaning when concentrating on small, separate units, and it makes no 
sense to talk of ethics when you are focusing on a small and detached part of a human 
being. The scientific development of medicine may thus have had an impact on the 
moral understanding within the medical profession, since the focus of attention has 
shifted away from the patient as an individual who is suffering, to the functions of a 
mechanical body. This makes the moral dimensions of medical interventions all the 
more imperceptible. 
 
1.2.3. Bioethical reasoning 
Although the first accounts of the discipline of medical ethics asserted that there was 
no more to it than applying standard ethical theory to the problems of medicine 
(Reich, 1978), the field actually has no unified theoretical foundation. This means 
that it is often taught as a mix of different ethical considerations, where principles, 
consequences and virtues are all taken into account. 
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The prevailing textbook in bioethics today is the now 6th edition of the “Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics” by Beauchamp and Childress (2009). Here, the writers identify 
four moral aspects as the main principles of medical work: autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence and justice. These are emphasised as “prima facie” principles, 
meaning that they are each morally binding unless they conflict with another morally 
binding principle that is more or equally important in a specific situation. These four 
principles are considered to be morally equal, and they have to be weighed against 
each other in the specific situation at hand in order to decide which principle to act 
upon. It is not enough for a doctor to argue that a medical intervention is in a 
patient’s best interests on the basis of the principle of beneficence; what the patient 
wants is also morally relevant according to the principle of respect for autonomy. In 
deciding what to do, the doctor thus has to balance these two important principles 
against each other and assess what action will be morally preferable overall. This 
model of moral reasoning is widely acknowledged in the field of bioethics, and is 
incorporated as the standard form of moral analysis. The model is practical to the 
point of being pragmatic, and can incorporate a plurality of moral arguments by 
relating them to the four principles and weighing them against each other. Certainly, 
the model does not solve the problem of the combination of the different forms of 
ethical reasoning that constitute the field of ethics. This means that the problem 
continues to be one of how to balance the different ethical principles when they 
conflict, and this is one of the major criticisms of the model (Callahan, 2003; Lee, 
2010). Another common concern is the emphasis that is often placed on the principle 
of autonomy, despite the explicit statement that all four principles should be given 
equal weight. Holm (1995) has drawn attention to the fact that the application of the 
“four principles approach” is often biased by the American emphasis on personal 
freedom. 
 
While the four principles’ approach is explicitly based on a form of common 
morality, it has deep roots in traditional philosophical ethics. In fact, it can be 
interpreted as an attempt to reconcile two traditional, opposing theories of ethics: 
utilitarianism and deontology. Utilitarianism emphasises the importance of 
anticipating the consequences of an act and assessing what action will produce the 
most benefits for the most people. This is similar to the principle of beneficence (and 
the principle of non-maleficence). The principle of autonomy, meanwhile, stresses 
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the morality of the action in itself, not the consequences of it, in line with 
deontological ethics (O’Neill, 2002). According to this kind of reasoning, some 
actions, such as respecting a person’s autonomy or abstaining from torture, are 
morally good or bad independently of the results they produce. 
 
A different and strong current in the field of medical ethics is the ethics of care. This 
movement regards the relationships between people as being constitutive of our 
moral responsibility. The presence of another person requires that I relate to him or 
her as a fellow human being, and the ethics of care emphasises that this mere 
presence has a moral meaning (Lévinas, 2003). In this view, the moral meaning is 
more than a calculated balancing of principles. Instead, what are central to this 
morality are feelings, compassion and empathy. This is seen as being particularly 
relevant in the field of medicine, where human suffering is often present, and the 
ethics of care as a discipline has been embraced by nurses in particular, who have 
more or less incorporated this approach into their professional identity (Tschudin, 
1992). The ethics of care also has clear roots in traditional moral philosophy, in 
which there is an array of movements that share some of the same moral grounds, 
such as the ethics of proximity, relationist ethics and feminist ethics (Martinsen, 
2011; Donchin, 2001). All of these movements share a common foundation in the 
ethics of virtue, which originate from Aristotle (1980). Virtues like courage, empathy 
and patience are moral dispositions that people may possess to varying degrees. In 
contrast to principle-based ethics, the ethics of virtue put the emphasis on the 
individual who acts, and not on the action or the consequences thereof. An 
individual’s motivations for acting play a vital part in how their actions are judged 
morally. The ethics of virtue often relate to striving to reach moral ideals, and it is 
your efforts that are important, not the effects you happen to have. This approach also 
has a clear resonance in professional medical ideals. Indeed, professional codes of 
ethics for medics were originally based on the image of a virtuous doctor, like in this 
quote from the first article in Percival’s medical codex (1985): “[Doctors] should 
study, also, in their department, so to unite tenderness with steadiness, and 
condescension with authority, as to inspire the minds of their patients with gratitude, 
respect and confidence.” In more recent codes, a form of principled-based ethics has 
become more prominent, as exemplified by the first article in the American Medical 
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Association’s Code of Ethics (2011): “A physician shall be dedicated to providing 
competent medical care, with compassion and respect for human dignity and rights.” 
Casuistry constitutes a third form of reasoning in medical ethics. It is worth 
mentioning in this brief overview because, although the term is not generally 
appreciated, the method is widely used in moral reasoning, and perhaps particularly 
so within medicine. Casuistry is a practical way of assessing moral cases, but has no 
firm theoretical basis. It originates from a Catholic, moral theology tradition that is 
occupied with resolving cases of conscience (Jonsen & Toulmin, 1988; Ruyter, 
1995). The method involves interpreting and analysing difficult moral cases by 
comparing them with similar examples that are already known to be morally good or 
bad. The point is to compare the specific circumstance before you with similar 
situations you have experienced or learnt from in the past. The purpose of this is to 
assess which morally relevant aspects of this new situation are different and which 
are the same. Should we assess this new circumstance in the same way, or are there 
morally important differences that compel us to modify our judgement? In this way, 
you build upon your previous moral knowledge and experiences in a very direct and 
concrete manner. This mode of moral reasoning by comparing circumstances with 
previous cases is very intuitive, and is often used by lay people. This means that this 
approach is attractive in medicine, since most health care workers have no training in 
philosophy or theology (Braunack-Mayer, 2001a). Moreover, the method 
concentrates on particular examples, and does not depend on theoretical agreement, 
which is often lacking in cases of medical ethics. While the tradition of casuistry has 
a rather poor reputation in moral philosophy, it has strengthened its position in 
medical ethics, in particular perhaps as the dominant mode of reasoning in the 
growing number of clinical ethics’ committees (Strong, 2000). The casuistic case-to-
case approach is also well known in legal circles, and in recognising the close 
relationship between jurisprudence and medical ethics, the development of this form 
of reasoning in the latter should not be surprising. 
 
1.2.4. Empirical research 
I have already postulated that doctors rarely articulate moral judgements in their daily 
practice. However, instead of interpreting this as a lack of moral understanding, it 
could be that their medical language and clinical practice are “morally loaded”; in 
other words, the moral dimension is always implicit in doctors’ medical judgements 
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in a way that makes it unnecessary to refer to a moral principle. This tacit way of 
handling the moral values of clinical practice makes it difficult to study the moral 
judgements made by doctors. Almost all of medical ethics research deals with ethics 
and values in an open and explicit way, yet some research does address the 
shortcomings of the dominant positions of medical ethics. I will not, however, 
attempt to provide a complete overview of the field of empirical research in medical 
ethics; instead, I will focus on the methods that have been used in this type of work 
and illustrate some of the various findings that have been made.  
 
Most studies approach the moral aspect of medical ethics in a straightforward 
manner, asking doctors or other health care personnel to speak about their 
experiences with moral problems in their work (Hurst et al., 2005). These studies are 
mainly based on qualitative interviews, and provide an interesting insight into the 
conscious moral reasoning of health care personnel when it comes to how they 
approach their work. Yet, one must expect this expressed moral analysis to be heavily 
influenced by modern bioethical principles, and it is questionable whether such an 
approach accurately reflects what the participants really do in a clinical setting. One 
concern relates to whether doctors really speak truthfully when asked about personal 
judgements that may have caused patients harm, while another is the natural tendency 
to embellish one’s own decisions in retrospect. A more serious problem, however, is 
that the researcher asks directly for the doctors’ experiences of moral problems or 
ethical dilemmas. This provides an insight into what doctors themselves perceive as 
morally important or difficult, but means that the researcher cannot penetrate the 
doctors’ descriptions and interpretations of what constitutes a moral action. When 
you ask someone to describe a moral problem, it requires whoever is interviewed to 
have defined these experiences within the field of morality. Accordingly, by asking 
these particular questions, a researcher would probably identify either the more 
exceptional, problematic or agonising cases, or those that have involved a major 
degree of conflict. Studies of clinical ethics’ committees reveal that these are indeed 
the types of cases that health care personnel label as “ethical problems” and thus 
present to an ethics’ committee (Førde & Vandvik, 2005; Hurst et al., 2007). 
Consequently, normal, day-to-day moral conduct or decisions would probably not be 
thought to be worth mentioning, or are not even thought of in terms of ethics by the 
respondents and so would not arise in such an interview. 
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While the tacit element of doctors’ moral conduct is barely touched upon by these 
direct questions, they do provide us with valuable knowledge of doctors’ explicit 
moral reasoning. Indeed, several of these studies have detected a discrepancy 
between bioethical categories and doctors’ actual reasoning, thereby discovering 
moral dimensions that were important to the participants, but are seldom addressed 
by bioethical discourse. We have already mentioned the studies by Holm (1997) and 
Arnman (2004), which drew attention to the notion of responsibility. Braunack-
Mayer (2001b; 2005) focused on the gap between moral theory and moral reasoning 
in her interview studies with general practitioners. She found that doctors’ moral 
reflections are richer than those in mainstream bioethics, with issues of relationships, 
personal integrity, accessibility and continuity being raised. Meanwhile, by asking 
internal medicine residents about improper, wrong, unethical, or unprofessional 
experiences, Rosenbaum et al. (2004) drew attention to issues of professional self-
regulation and the limits of personal competence. The focus group is another method 
that is commonly used for the same purpose. In their study, Ginsburg et al. (2002) 
utilised focus group interviews with medical students, asking them to discuss 
professional dilemmas and lapses in professional behaviour. It was found that issues 
which do not fit easily into the category of traditional moral principles, like 
communicative violation, role resistance and objectification, were raised. A number 
of quantitative approaches, and telephone questionnaires in particular, have also been 
used to address ethical experiences in medical practice. DuVal et al. (2004) found 
that nearly 90% of doctors questioned had recently faced ethical dilemmas, with end-
of-life care issues and questions of justice being those that were most commonly 
encountered. Although these studies have a certain validity that might persuade 
quantitatively inclined medical professionals, they are actually even more bound to 
the pre-set definitions of ethics and moral reasoning. This means that they are unfit 
for purpose when it comes to identifying new and unexpected aspects of the 
reasoning of doctors. 
 
Some studies focus on the other moral aspects involved in caring for patients, with 
moral distress being one example. Kälvemark et al. (2004) used focus groups to 
investigate the moral distress of health care personnel, and found that the entire 
sample had experienced this form of stress, which was often caused by conflicts 
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between personal moral standards and institutional or governmental regulations. 
Førde and Aasland (2008), meanwhile, used a postal survey to investigate the moral 
distress experienced by Norwegian doctors, and found that it was widespread, 
particularly in relation to dilemmas concerning a lack of resources. Like research into 
moral experiences, these studies also rely on predefined notions of moral issues and 
ethical problems. Other empirical studies, however, aim to evaluate the moral 
competence of professionals, and many of these pieces of work apply approaches 
from moral psychology (Bebeau, 2002). The studies typically rely on interviews or 
questionnaires to identify the participants’ moral assessments through their arguments 
in a hypothetical moral case. Using a questionnaire and coding answers by stages of 
moral development, Patenaude et al. (2003) identified a significant decline in the 
moral development of students between their first and third years of medical school. 
Similar approaches have been used to examine the moral reasoning of health care 
personnel. In particular, Self et al. (1993) used interviews to analyse this issue and 
found that the doctors in their sample had consistently lower scores for this skill than 
the clinical ethicists. This research probably reveals some elements of the cognitive 
ability of doctors to make moral judgements according to a set of bioethical 
principles. However, it again does not tell us much about how doctors actually 
behave in the clinical setting. In particular, using predefined answers in a 
questionnaire or hypothetical cases shapes participants’ answers to a great degree. 
Moreover, such approaches do not adequately take into account the fact that the 
respondents may have a deeper and more complex understanding of the issues than 
the researcher. Accordingly, the moral understanding that comes with managing 
actual cases, with all of their situational nuances, is thus poorly measured by these 
kinds of studies. 
 
Another common way of addressing the moral content of medical practice is by 
observation, using a more descriptive or ethnographic approach. Utilising participant 
observation, Robertson (1996) studied a psychiatric ward for geriatrics and found that 
while the health care professionals did not discuss issues in ethical terms, traditional 
ethical concepts were useful for describing their ethical approaches. However, 
because Robertson defined relevant events as “ethically laden decision-making”, and 
tested the relevance of three different moral principles on the basis of these events, 
his observations and analysis are closely bound to traditional bioethical concepts. 
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Meanwhile, Braddock et al. (1999) analysed audio taped patient-doctor encounters to 
explore how well the latter adhere to the requirements of informed decision-making. 
Their conclusion was that patients were not adequately included in the decisions 
made about them, while ethical ideals were not implemented in the doctors’ routine 
practices. Others have used a more open approach to observation, and have not 
started from explicit moral principles. Reiter-Theil (2004), for example, developed 
the concept of the “embedded researcher”, in which researchers conducted their 
investigations in the relevant clinical context without participating in clinical practice. 
The purpose of this approach was to enable the more rigorous observation and 
documentation of clinical reality. In their study of an intensive care unit, they found 
that ethics was understood as a matter of personal sensitivity, integrity and 
conscience, and did not involve the interpretation of ethical guidelines. Kaufman 
(1998) used an ethnographic approach to observe elderly patients who died in an 
intensive care unit. Although she did not focus specifically on ethical issues, she 
concluded that the way in which we speak about end-of-life choices and our ideas of 
“a good death” are far from the practical reality of dying in hospital.  
 
If we understand the practical morality of everyday medicine as a tacit dimension in 
doctors’ language and practice, we can hardly expect to expose it by direct 
questioning. Furthermore, using well-known ethical categories will probably hamper 
any attempt to reveal the novel dimensions of doctors’ moral reasoning that might 
reduce, or at least explain, the lacuna between medical practice and medical ethics. 
While the large and varied field of research into medical ethics has provided us with 
some important insights into what doctors perceive as moral problems, how they use 
ethical concepts and how they argue about values, there seems to have been little 
work on the tacit moral dimensions of everyday medical practice. 
 
1.3. Method 
Since the main starting point for this study was that the field of medical ethics does 
not seem to fit well with medical practice, it was vital to not begin the research with 
predetermined categories from this discipline, an issue I will soon return to. Our aim 
was to identify the values that are implicit in the clinical work of doctors, but do not 
seem to correspond with established principles of medical ethics. With its aim of 
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generating new theories from empirical data, the Grounded Theory approach 
appeared to be suitable for the purposes of undertaking such a research project. 
 
1.3.1. Grounded Theory  
In 1967, Barney G. Glaser and Anselm Strauss wrote “The discovery of Grounded 
Theory”, and in doing so developed a new method that has greatly influenced 
qualitative research, initially within the field of sociology, but eventually in other 
areas such as the study of health care (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The authors originally 
developed the method as an alternative to what they called “grand theories”, namely 
the major sociological theories in which abstraction, logical coherence and deductive 
reasoning are the central elements. According to Glaser and Strauss, these grand 
theories have a tendency to lead to concepts and hypotheses that are difficult to use in 
practical work, and which often fit poorly with how participants in the research field 
actually experience their actions. To counter this, they believed that new theories 
should be grounded in empirical data from the field. They also wanted to distance 
themselves from research which merely seeks to provide a thorough description of 
the research field. Instead, they stressed the importance of processing descriptions in 
order to produce analytical concepts and gain a theoretical understanding of the data. 
The end product of Grounded Theory research is specifically meant to be a theory of 
the research field. In order to avoid too much hypothetical speculation and abstract 
construction, researchers should enter the research field without a clear-cut 
hypothesis. The main point of this method is to not force a predefined theory onto the 
research material, but to instead enable the theoretical concepts to emerge from it, 
thereby obtaining a theory that is grounded in the data. According to Glaser and 
Strauss, this grounding ensures that the theory fits the research field, that it is relevant 
to the participants and also has consequences for practical work. 
 
Glaser and Strauss’ reflections on sociological theories, which led to the discovery of 
Grounded Theory, did also seem relevant for the perceived difficulties with bioethical 
theory. Indeed, beginning with empirical data to improve a theoretical understanding 
of practice did coincide with the ways in which it seemed useful to address the 
clinical field. Moreover, the method’s focus on the need to create new concepts and 
hypotheses that are: based on empirical data; illuminating; and useful to participants 
matched our purpose of achieving new explanatory models with which to improve 
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our understanding of how doctors deal with the moral aspects of clinical work. 
Grounded Theory is partly rooted in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, and 
seeks to conceptualise the meaning of social events and interactions (Wilson & 
Hutchinson, 1991). The emphasis on the significance of actions also seemed to fit our 
purpose of illuminating the tacit values of clinical work: how are doctors’ moral 
values expressed through their medical language and clinical practice? 
 
Another major aspect of Grounded Theory is that the method seeks to create new 
theoretical explanations, thus distinguishing it from studies aimed at testing 
predetermined hypotheses. Grounded Theory research is not intended to verify or 
reject existing hypotheses or theories of the field. Instead, the aim is to develop a new 
theory in either an area of research that has been inadequately explored, or in areas 
that are dominated by deductive, abstract theories. This was fitting, because we 
considered it to be essential to not start from the traditional concepts and theories of 
modern bioethics. Instead, we wanted to identify new ways of describing the moral 
dimensions of clinical work which relate to doctors’ own understanding of what they 
do. The method differs from descriptive analysis and ethnography in that it does not 
aim to produce a mere detailed description of the research field. Instead, the goal is to 
achieve a more abstract understanding of the data, thereby generating theoretical 
hypotheses in the field of research based on the material that is obtained. Likewise, 
the aim of our research was not to describe the doctors’ decisions and actions, but to 
enhance the theoretical understanding of moral action in every day clinical work. 
 
1.3.2. Previous knowledge 
A more problematic aspect of Grounded Theory is its disapproval of previous 
knowledge. Indeed, the method can be interpreted as asserting that all previous 
hypotheses and knowledge of a research field are distracting and constricting 
elements that must be discarded in order to identify the “real” issues of the field. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the method was launched as an alternative 
to deductive theories and the testing of hypotheses. Glaser and Strauss explicitly deny 
that the researcher is supposed to approach the field as a “tabula rasa”, but they do 
nonetheless express a strong objectivity ideal. For instance, they emphasise that 
researchers should ideally have no previous knowledge of the field in order to 
concentrate on it without bias and prejudiced hypotheses. This includes not reading 
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literature or studies on the subject before conducting a piece of research, and 
attempting to disregard known concepts and theories. According to Glaser and 
Strauss, researchers should also not approach the field with a prepared research 
question, because this would imply that you have already defined what is important 
or what constitutes an issue for the participants you wish to study. Taken to the 
extreme, this view corresponds to a positivistic belief that the truth will emerge if you 
just stare long and objectively enough at the data. Sometimes, Glaser and Strauss 
seem to trust that the theories will be embedded in the empirical data, and believe that 
the researcher’s work should involve the discovery of this inner logic. Indeed, critics 
do allege that the method verges on radical empiricism (Thomas & James, 2006). 
 
In light of modern philosophy of science, believing that you can study the data 
without preconceived categories appears naive. Certainly, it would be impossible 
even to approach a research field if you do not in advance identify what the research 
field is and why you want to study it by using predetermined categories. In 
subsequent books, Glaser has met these objections and even stressed that researchers 
need to expand their knowledge of theoretical codes in order to improve their 
theoretical sensitivity (1978). Still, the rejection of previous knowledge was 
especially problematic for our research because it was precisely this that led us to this 
project. It was a familiarity with ethical theory along with the experience in clinical 
work that bioethics does not “fit” the context that had been decisive in even 
identifying a problem. Without this kind of previous knowledge, we might have more 
readily accepted the participants’ explicit beliefs about medical ethics even if it did 
not match their moral conduct. Since we wanted to study how doctors deal with the 
moral aspects of their clinical work, it seemed vital to be aware that they rarely 
discuss moral questions openly, with moral dimensions instead being imbedded in a 
value laden medical language and practice. Indeed, to reach these hidden aspects of 
medical practice, we found it advantageous to be familiar with the inner structures of 
the profession, the significance of medical terminology and where the medical 
decisions are made. Moreover, particular knowledge of the field could make it easier 
to direct resources to where you would get the most out of the data. At its best, 
previous knowledge seems to enable the researcher to probe deeper into the field than 
is possible for unbiased researchers who rely on approaching the data with “an open 
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mind”. Although there is certainly a risk of being blinkered when conducting research 
in one’s own culture, previous knowledge may also be quite valuable. 
 
1.3.3. Trusting the researcher 
Perhaps the model of Glaser and Strauss do not have to be interpreted as strictly as 
some critics choose to. Indeed, throughout the research process, these authors 
maintain confidence in the researcher’s ability to recognise what is relevant and 
important for a particular study. When they state that a theory will emerge from data, 
this can be understood as trusting the researcher’s personal ability to conduct a 
meaningful analysis of the material that has been collected. This confidence in the 
researcher’s ability to critically analyse his or her own work without a rigid, 
predefined set of rules, gives the method a flexibility that makes it well suited to 
research in which the actions of the participants cannot be predicted in advance. It 
also provides an opportunity to focus on the aspects of the data that prove to be the 
most interesting and informative during analysis. Instead of predefined selection 
criteria, Grounded Theory employs what is described as theoretical sampling, 
meaning that the researcher must re-evaluate which groups of participants to include 
during the course of a study. In this way, the study can adjust to what the data 
gradually reveal. 
 
Moreover, by placing trust in the researcher’s management and analysis of the data, 
the method also allows the use of many different types of information. Casual 
observation, overheard conversations and different forms of literature also count as 
data if they are managed as separate sources thereof and critically assessed as such. 
All sources of data are, in principle, allowed as long as the data are analysed 
according to the context in which they appeared. Glaser and Strauss also explicitly 
state that the method is suitable for both qualitative and quantitative research, 
although few quantitative studies have actually used it. The multiple data sources and 
the autonomy of the researcher are justified on the basis that the method does not 
pretend to verify a hypothesis, but is aimed at generating new theories. Reading 
Grounded Theory with some goodwill, researchers are given freedom and autonomy 
as long as they constantly and critically assess for possible bias and ground their 
analysis in real, empirical data. The details of the method can thus be regarded as 
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practical steps that generate creativeness and enable the researchers to conceptualise 
empirical data. 
 
1.3.4. Glaser or Strauss 
It is crucial to note that Grounded Theory is not an unambiguous method; its two 
authors have gone on to develop it in divergent directions since their initial joint 
publication of “The Discovery of Grounded Theory” in 1967, creating two separate 
“schools” of Grounded Theory in the process. Indeed, both Glaser and Strauss have 
published subsequent textbooks which describe in more detail how to perform 
Grounded Theory studies. Yet these books differ quite considerably, and the former 
partnership turned into a disagreement about what the method was all about and who 
was entitled to describe a particular approach as Grounded Theory (Glaser, 1992). In 
collaboration with Juliet Corbin, Strauss wrote a textbook on qualitative research and 
Grounded Theory which was very popular among qualitative researchers and 
profoundly affected the development of how the method is conceived (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Glaser has also written several books in which he explains the method 
in more detail, while simultaneously distinguishing it from Strauss and Corbin’s more 
descriptive approach (Glaser 1978; 1992; 1998; 2005). 
 
In their textbook, Strauss and Corbin formulated a detailed description of the 
analytical procedure in Grounded Theory, stressing a systematic approach to the data 
and leading to a standardisation of the research process that makes it easier for 
beginners to use the method. This description differs from Glaser’s version in several 
ways, and I will only comment on some of the main differences here (Hartman, 
2001). According to Corbin and Strauss, a researcher should begin by defining a 
research question. This approach clearly already departs from that of Glaser, who 
maintains that it is important not to define a research question before commencing a 
study, because this will guide the approach to the field; if a researcher wants to 
understand the behaviour of participants, one has to be genuinely open to what they 
themselves regard as being important. Corbin and Strauss divide research into three 
different phases: open, axial and focused. While the open phase is similar to Glaser’s 
open coding, in the axial phase, the researcher describes the properties of and 
relationships between categories according to an elaborate paradigm model. In terms 
of cause and effect, this model is intended to force the researcher to think 
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systematically about his or her categories and their relationships. Glaser, meanwhile, 
believes that this procedure is in opposition to the notion of Grounded Theory. This is 
because it forces the researcher to think about the data according to a predetermined 
scheme, creating connections that might not be relevant to the research field. In 
Corbin and Strauss’ focused phase, the researcher is expected to choose a core 
category, integrate the theory around it and attempt to verify it through a constant 
comparison of cases. In Glaser’s version, meanwhile, the core category is chosen 
much earlier in the research, which makes it central to the further gathering and 
analysis of the data. In this way, the core category guides the emerging theory to a 
greater extent. Glaser also rejects any attempts to verify the theory in the same data 
from which it emerged. All in all, Corbin and Strauss seem to have developed their 
method more in line with analytical description, focusing less on the abstraction to 
theory and depending more on predetermined hypotheses in data processing. Glaser 
is generally thought to have remained more faithful to the original method as 
launched in “The Discovery of Grounded Theory”. In our research, we have mainly 
followed the Glaserian account of Grounded Theory, which is also the version that is 
closest to our intentions for this research project.  
 
1.3.5. What is theory? 
In daily speech, the word “theory” is used to describe a range of different features, 
such as an analytical distance, lists of definitions, hypotheses and mathematical 
equations. Often, the term is used to attain an air of credibility or prestige, which is 
indeed some of the objections that have been raised against Grounded Theory, and 
this is why it might be helpful to clarify the concept.   
 
In philosophy of science, a theory is generally understood as an aggregate of 
hypotheses in which the relations between the hypotheses are defined (Bojer et al., 
1993). For our purpose, we can roughly differentiate between two types of theory; 
theory that aims to explain a phenomenon, and theory that aims to understand a 
phenomenon. These distinctions more or less correlate to the differences of natural 
science and humanistic interpretation, which Snow described as “the two cultures” 
(1993). Theories in physics, for instance, aim to explain and predict physical 
phenomena, and the hypotheses are intensively tested in an attempt to falsify the 
theory. Theories in social science, on the other hand, focus on interpersonal, 
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meaningful phenomena, which cannot be explained and predicted in any equivalent 
sense. They are rather interpretations and patternings that help us in thinking about a 
phenomenon. Furthermore, in social science, the hypotheses are often more loosely 
related, and theories are rarely described in strict terms of cause and effect, which is 
the ideal of natural science theories. While a humanistic understanding might serve 
its purpose very well, the problem arises if researchers claim these theories to have 
the same epistemological status as theories of explanation. 
 
First of all, the very name might be confusing, because Grounded Theory does not 
purports to be a theory in itself, but a method that facilitates the generation of theories 
(more specifically, the generation of grounded theories). While Grounded Theory 
embraces both quantitative and qualitative studies, the method is firmly based in 
social science. It seeks to verbalise phenomena into categories with certain properties 
and to express the relations between them. These relations may be described in terms 
of causes, but also as contexts, processes, degrees, dimensions and so on (Glaser, 
1978, p. 74-81). When Glaser and Strauss emphasise that the end product of a 
Grounded Theory study is a theory, we perceive this in the sense of social science 
theories that aim to understand a research field. With our research, we hope to 
generate abstract concepts and interrelations that will illuminate medical moral 
practice. 
 
Glaser and Strauss tend to engage in polemics against grand deductive theories, and 
they have been criticised for idealising inductive reasoning and ignoring the close 
relation between deduction and induction in theory construction (Thomas & James, 
2006). This is, however, an overly negative interpretation of the method. While they 
emphasise the importance of inductive reasoning when managing empirical data, 
Glaser and Strauss also repeatedly stress the deductive elements of the method, like 
theoretical sampling and testing of conceptual ideas. It is not to be ignored, however, 
that there are ambiguities to Grounded Theory and its theoretical end products, not 
least because of how its two originators have diverged in their development of the 
method.  
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1.3.6. My use of Grounded Theory 
We have used much time to clarify whether or not we could use Grounded Theory for 
this project. I presented our plan for the first study on two consecutive Grounded 
Theory seminars led by Dr Glaser in London in 2006 and 2007. Our use of the 
method was thoroughly discussed and supported by Dr Glaser and the group of 
experienced Grounded Theory researchers. The crux of the matter was that we 
wanted to look specifically for how doctors handle the moral dimensions of clinical 
practice. To narrow down the research focus to a specific field of interest, is generally 
frowned upon within this method. The main objections that were raised were that one 
could not know beforehand that moral issues would emerge from the data, and thus 
we risked that the doctors would not be concerned with moral issues and that we 
would not get the data we needed. An often-used example is a researcher who set out 
to study risk-taking among steeplejacks by the use of Grounded Theory and 
discovered that they did not speak about risk-taking at all, and so had to give up this 
focus (Glaser, 1998, p. 115). Although the problem of defining an issue before 
undertaking a study is pertinent in principle, the starting point for our research was 
quite different. I would not be surprised if doctors did not speak of ethics; on the 
contrary, this was expected from my knowledge of the field. Still, the moral aspects 
of the doctors’ conduct would be present even if the doctors did not mention them, 
and our intentions were to see how the doctors dealt with these dimensions, implicitly 
or explicitly. What gradually became clear was that, while in the field, the data 
collection should not be limited to the moral dimension. We ought to gather the data 
broadly, looking for the participants’ main concern in line with Grounded Theory 
requirements. When analysing the data, we could then focus more specifically on 
what the data meant to the moral dimension of medical practice. 
 
To us, the issue was not how to carry out the study within the Grounded Theory 
paradigm, but whether the method was suited to accomplish the kind of research that 
we wanted to conduct. Objections can be made to our use of the method because of 
our previous knowledge, our delimited focus on ethics and because we started out 
with a research question, however loosely defined. Although we do not find it vital to 
label our method “Grounded Theory”, we have followed the theoretical foundations 
and practical procedures of the method to such an extent that it would be misleading 
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not to do so. My previous knowledge stemmed from first hand experiences from the 
field and our research question was grounded in empirical data, even if it was not 
collected systematically or scientifically. We were acquainted with the literature and 
theories of professional culture and medical ethics, but we did not follow these 
theories in the data collection and analysis. Indeed, in line with Grounded Theory, we 
attempted to remain open to the participants’ own explanations and motives, and to 
analyse their moral conduct on the basis of how the doctors acted in their clinical 
work. We have tried to take the consequences of the central theme in Grounded 
Theory, also supported by philosophical hermeneutics, to treat all information as 
data, including our previous knowledge and experiences as well as the reactions to 
our findings, as will be revealed later on.  
 
2. Conducting the studies 
2.1. Study I 
2.1.1. Practical considerations 
The ideal in terms of our research would be to address clinical practice in a way that 
interferes as little as possible with normal clinical work. This would be an approach 
that allowed the doctors to carry out their normal work routine, and at the same time 
revealed some of their moral assessments. Since our interest was primarily in doctors’ 
tacit knowledge, we were reluctant to use interviews as our main source of data. 
Accordingly, observing the clinical setting seemed to be the only way forward. It is 
not, however, easy to intrude into clinical practice without disturbing a normal 
consultation between patient and doctor. Yet, much of the work done by doctors is 
not as private and sensitive as one might expect. Indeed, in hospitals, a lot of work is 
carried out in collaboration with others, such as nurses, assistants or other doctors. 
Moreover, many aspects of the work are conducted when the patient is not even 
present.  
 
Our intention with the first study was to follow several doctors over the course of 
their working day, using participant observation to obtain the most accurate 
impression of their normal activities, different work settings and concerns in trying to 
perform their day-to-day tasks. In particular, we wanted to observe how different 
moral situations arose during the day and how the doctors responded to these. This 
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would mean observing the interactions between doctor and patient and thus 
participating in clinical consultations. Yet for many doctors, especially those who 
work in a hospital setting, their daily work consists of more than patient encounters. 
They participate in daily internal meetings and reports, they confer with fellow 
doctors and superiors, they prepare examinations and treatment for patients, they 
follow up on test results, they assist at operations and so on. Since the purpose of our 
research was not to study patients, but to examine doctors’ actions and decisions, we 
concluded that it was necessary to follow the doctors throughout the day, rather than 
just observing their contact with patients. In addition, following each doctor over the 
course of a full day’s work would provide an important source of continuity when it 
came to understanding his or her actions and choices. 
 
This did, however, pose some practical problems. Being a doctor, I could readily get 
access to hospital wards. What is more, doctors are used to having third-party 
observers present, especially medical students or house officers, and they often enjoy 
having a colleague to talk to or lecture. The problem was instead related to the fact 
that I would now be observing, not as a fellow doctor or medical student, but as a 
researcher. Medical research regulations meant that I was regarded as an outsider, 
and thus had no involvement with the treatment of patients and no access to patient 
information. Research should, of course, ideally be based on the informed consent of 
those who participate in it. All of the doctors in our study thus received written 
information about the project and gave their written and informed consent to our 
involvement, but what about the patients? In medical consultations, it seems 
reasonable to include the patients as participants and obtain their informed consent, 
since they would be central to the circumstances and actions being observed. Yet, it 
would be odd to define all of the other patients in a ward as participants just because 
they had been admitted to it. In any event, the majority of the patients in a ward 
would not be observed, only those who happened to come into contact with the 
doctor we were watching, and even then they would not be the focus of the 
observation. Indeed, in studying the doctors’ working day, it was other health care 
personnel, patients and visitors who would make up the environment in which the 
doctors were working and acting. Should we ask all of these “potential participants” 
for their informed consent? In other observational studies, such as in ethnography, it 
is normally just the main informant or informants who give their consent to being 
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observed, and not everyone that they happen to interact with. The nature of 
observation is considered to be much more intimidating for the prime subject thereof. 
Indeed, it is clear that patients should be better protected than the general population, 
but would it be ethical to ask every patient in a hospital ward to consider the study 
information, take a stand about whether or not to participate and sign an informed 
consent form when just a few of them would actually meet the researcher? In the end, 
we decided to apply for an exemption from the duty of confidentiality so that we 
could be present in hospital departments, observing the doctors’ work and their 
interactions with patients, without having to ask all of those who had been admitted 
to a ward for informed consent. This process took a year of applications and re-
applications before our request was finally granted. 
 
In the meantime, we began by observing general practitioners. The reason for this 
was partly methodological and partly practical. On a practical note, general practice 
is a setting in which we could ask all patients for their informed consent and observe 
doctors throughout their working day. Moreover, methodologically, we expected 
there to be much diversity in terms of patient groups and clinical questions in general 
practice. General practitioners are relatively autonomous in their work, which we 
thought could lead to substantial personal variations in how they handled their 
patients. In addition, we did not want to select a particular branch of medicine in 
which we knew that the need to make clear moral choices would be abundant, such as 
in oncology, the provision of abortions or when issues relating to the termination of 
life-prolonging treatment arise; these are all cases that have been thoroughly 
discussed in the medical ethics’ literature. Because such cases are already known to 
be “morally loaded”, it is to be expected that the decisions made and discussions 
taking place in these settings would be significantly influenced by medical ethics 
theory, and, therefore, perhaps not reflective of the more common moral 
considerations made by doctors. Since we wanted to study normal, day-to-day 
clinical practice, we believed that general practice would be a good starting point. 
 
2.1.2. Interviews 
While observing doctors at work seemed to be the best way of addressing tacit issues, 
our research aim still posed us some challenges because we had opted to deal with 
matters of morality. Is it even possible to observe the morality of behaviour? I do not 
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believe that there is a simple answer to this question. Certainly, there are aspects of 
morality that are visible to outsiders. Aggressive behaviour and violence, as well as 
ridiculing and ignoring an individual, can often be noticeable to someone from a 
similar community. Likewise, expressions of pain, sorrow and anger may be 
observable. Yet more subtle feelings are not so easily spotted, and nor are other 
important moral dimensions like motives and ideals. We decided to compensate for 
some of this loss by also conducting interviews with the participating doctors to learn 
something about their motives and reflections. Nevertheless, because of our interest 
in the tacit dimension, it continued to be important to us to attach most weight to our 
observations of what the doctors did and let this guide the interviews. We, therefore, 
decided to always conduct the interviews after the observations and ensure that the 
questions related to the medical work we had observed. This would enable us to 
remain as close to ordinary practice as possible and avoid more hypothetical 
speculation. We chose not to interview patients because our initial focus was on the 
doctors, and we found this to be a necessary limitation of the research labour. As the 
research proceeded, this drawback became more evident and it remains an important 
limitation to our study, which is further discussed in the study limitations section. 
 
We did at some point consider the possibility of conducting focus group interviews. 
Indeed, this may well have been time effective, since we would get the views of 
several doctors at once. It might also highlight certain discussions which were 
internal to the group and would not otherwise arise. Moreover, it would probably also 
be difficult for the participants to embellish reality, since there were others present 
who would know the same reality. So, before finishing the design of the study, I 
conducted a focus group test, inviting a few doctors from one medical department to 
an informal lunch meeting and discussion. The doctors were of both sexes, different 
ages and from all stages of specialisation. The tone was informal and positive and 
most of the doctors did participate in the discussion. However, when I asked a 
question about uncertainty, in particular how doctors make many of their decisions 
day to day, often on the basis of limited data, the talking stopped. One of the senior 
consultants present stated that insecurity was the preserve of house officers or 
students, and while discussing this topic might be an issue for inexperienced doctors, 
it was no longer a problem for their senior colleagues. After this statement had been 
made, a couple of the doctors who had seemed to be about to comment remained 
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silent. This incident made me realise that some kinds of confessions might be 
difficult for doctors to make in the presence of their colleagues, even if my question 
had actually been about the innate uncertainty of decisions. It also demonstrated how 
the hierarchical structure of the profession could silence subordinates when a senior 
colleague had already made his or her views known. Some of these problems could 
probably have been dealt with by a different focus group design, but, as we still 
expected the data to be very dependent on specific group composition, we decided 
that individual interviews would be more advantageous. 
 
2.1.3. In the field 
Forming the sample of general practitioners was initially convenience based. A GP 
who had a particular interest in clinical communication was asked and agreed to 
participate, and he contacted three colleagues who also agreed to take part in the 
study. The doctors were first told about the study verbally and then received an 
information letter about it along with the informed consent form. The doctors were 
told that I was working on a PhD-project in medical ethics and that I was interested in 
what issues doctors deal with in their clinical work, with a particular focus on the 
value-laden aspects of medicine. I normally went to the office in question a day 
before the study was to commence to notify the office secretaries about it and give 
them the patient consent forms. On the day of the study itself, there would be a 
placard on the wall in the waiting room with information about the research and 
which doctor was involved. Meanwhile, the secretaries would give the informed 
consent forms to the patients who had appointments with the doctor I was observing 
and then collect them when they had been completed. If a patient did not want me to 
be present in the consultation, the secretary would report this to the doctor and I 
would wait in a nearby room. Very few patients declined to participate. 
 
In accordance with Grounded Theory, I tried to approach the field with an open mind, 
although being a doctor I did indeed know the clinical work and circumstances that 
might arise. However, I attempted to put my medical interest in the background and 
concentrate on the human interactions. At first, this proved to be quite difficult to 
achieve. I found myself wondering what illness a patient was suffering from and 
trying to work out what examinations the doctor would undertake next. However, I 
frequently forced myself to focus on other aspects of the scenario: how did the 
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doctors pose or move their bodies? How did the patients sit? What were the 
surroundings like? How did the patients phrase their concerns? How did the doctors 
react? When did the doctors interrupt the patients, and when did they follow up on a 
patient’s worries? When did the doctors record in the patient journal? These were the 
kinds of questions that I tried to concentrate on when observing the doctors, along 
with the general questions that were always at the back of my mind: what is 
happening here? What are the doctors’ main concerns?  
 
We did not tape record the encounters because we did not want to disturb the 
consultations any more than I already had done with my presence. In addition, my 
attention was primarily on observing the encounter overall, not just the spoken 
dialogue, and so tape recordings would place too much focus on the audible 
dimension of the situation. Another option was to conduct video recordings, but we 
considered this to be too great an intrusion into the consultation. Moreover, since I 
intended to follow the doctors over the course of their entire working day, in both 
patient and non-patient settings, I would have been required to walk around with a 
video camera on my shoulder, which was not realistic. Instead, I tried to be a more 
anonymous part of the setting. I normally sat in a corner of the office, sometimes 
dressed in a white coat and sometimes in my normal clothes, depending on the doctor 
under observation. I took notes throughout the day, but not while a patient was 
present. The doctors and patients only rarely spoke to me during the consultations, 
but after the latter had left the former would often address me as a fellow colleague or 
student, inviting me to comment. I also took notes on these events, as well as on the 
work the doctors did in between patients. Finally, I was able to observe other non-
patient situations which were part of the doctors’ working day, like joint lunches, 
internal staff meetings, telephone consultations and dealing with paperwork. 
 
In order to exemplify this part of the process, I give a brief illustration of my notes. 
The first one is taken during a patient consultation; the second one is from an internal 
morning session: 
 
Young, female patient; seems new to the doctor. Immediately pulls out her mobile phone; says she 
has several issues and that she has brought a list. The doctor sits back in his chair, appears calm; 
does not speak, but awaits the patient. The patient wonders if he could check up on her blood 
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count, because it has previously been low. “...and I have celiac disease, just so that you know”. 
“Yes”, the doctor replies “certainly”. He turns to the computer and prints out a form, the patient 
continues to speak. 
 
All of the doctors are gathered around a table, the senior consultants on one end, younger doctors, 
house officers and students on the other end. There are not enough seats; some younger colleagues 
sit on chairs and sofas nearby. The house officer (who has been on duty the previous night) 
presents the new patients without interruptions, sometimes supplied by a senior colleague. The 
other doctors look down at their patient lists; hardly any comments or emotional expressions. 
 
Grounded Theory recommends that the researcher does not record observations and 
interviews, but instead takes notes during the fieldwork. It is argued that recording 
situations produces too much data, which often overwhelms researchers. Researchers 
should instead trust in their own abilities to discover what is of interest in the scenario 
being observed. Since the method is aimed at producing a theory that illuminate what 
happens in the observed field rather than accurate descriptions, meticulous recordings 
of the precise dialogue used or body language exhibited are beyond the scope of the 
research. Grounded Theory stresses that researchers should be realistic about what 
they can do and should also take care to utilise their time and efforts where they are 
needed most. Consequently, researchers must use their skills actively in the 
fieldwork, focusing closely on what is actually happening. 
 
After the doctor had finished his or her final consultation, we built in time for an 
interview, which normally lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. I began these sessions 
by asking the participants about how they thought the day had gone and how they had 
felt about being observed. Most stated that they believed that things had gone well, 
and while they had initially been very aware of my presence, they had soon forgotten 
about the observation and carried on as normal. I went on to ask about the day’s work 
and whether the doctor regarded this to have been a normal working day. I asked if 
there had been patients or situations that they had found particularly difficult to 
handle and if there had been circumstances in which they had felt positive about their 
efforts and thought that they had been good doctors. Normally, this would lead to 
follow-up questions which attempted to probe what the doctors had experienced as 
difficult or satisfactory and what they were striving to achieve. I would also ask 
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questions about particular patients or situations that I had taken note of as being 
especially interesting, surprising or difficult to comprehend. 
 
This is a small example of such a questioning from an interview: 
Interviewer: Were there any patients today who you found particularly difficult or demanding? 
Doctor: (stops to think) Perhaps the elderly lady, I always think that she is a lot older than she 
really is, I have problems in understanding what it is she really wants. I wish she could be a bit 
clearer and say: ”I am here for a blood pressure check-up”. Instead, I have to ask her: “Are you 
here for a blood pressure check-up?” I get so insecure... 
Interviewer: She brought up a lot of complaints: aches, ringing in the ears, anxieties... 
Doctor: Yes, she speaks of it every time! 
Interviewer: Is that why you did not follow up on any of that? 
Doctor: (laughs a little embarrassed) Yes. We have gone through these issues earlier and she 
presented them in exactly the same manner that time. So I did not feel like there was anything 
new. 
 
After the interview, the doctors would often ask me for my opinions and feedback on 
what I had witnessed, but this turned out to be surprisingly difficult to respond to. My 
notes mainly consisted of pieces of events and analysis and associations, and I was 
thus rarely able to provide any clear summary or make suggestions about what all of 
this information might mean. After I had left the doctor’s office, I then sat down to 
complete my notes, going over the events again and again in my mind and writing 
down fragments of what might be of interest. This process actually took a lot of time, 
even taking me up to a week after the initial observation before I was then ready to 
observe the next doctor. 
 
2.1.4. Theoretical sampling 
Starting with general practitioners was, as noted earlier, both convenient and 
methodologically favourable. Thereafter, the further inclusion of the other doctors 
who we wanted to participate was achieved by making reference to what we judged 
would provide us with the most interesting and important data; in other words, we 
conducted what is known in Grounded Theory as theoretical sampling. We also took 
some more practical considerations into account relating to who not to include. On 
this basis, we ruled out psychiatric departments, paediatric departments and intensive 
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care units because of the vulnerability of their patients and the challenges of 
obtaining valid, informed consent. It seemed natural, however, to try to include 
doctors from different specialities in order to cover a wide range of patient cases, but 
also because it is common knowledge among the profession that different areas of 
work foster (or attract) different personality types. After recruiting the initial four 
general practitioners, we then decided to include a department of internal medicine 
with a specialised field and dealing with seriously ill patients. Indeed, since the 
avoidance of existential issues was already apparent at this stage, we thought that it 
would be illuminating to include a department wherein existential issues were 
imminent. Accordingly, three doctors from this department were also recruited. 
Thereafter, we wanted to involve a surgical department because the doctors therein 
deal with a quite different patient group and encounter other types of challenges. 
What is more, surgeons are not generally known for emphasising empathic 
communication or expressing their interest in medical ethics. We thus involved three 
doctors from a general surgical department. After this, we decided to also include 
another department of internal medicine, in which we expected to find complex 
medical issues as well as a need to make difficult moral judgements. Again, we 
wanted to test the role of patients’ existential worries, which would almost certainly 
be an issue for this patient group. Accordingly, three doctors were included from this 
department. Having spent a lot of time inside hospitals, we then decided to recruit 
two more general practitioners in order to test our emerging theory. Finally, over a 
year later, and after writing the draft of the first manuscript, we included two more 
doctors from a general department of internal medicine, both to investigate some of 
the sceptical feedback we had received on our theory and to probe where to go next 
with our research. 
 
When attempting to recruit doctors from hospital departments, I first contacted the 
senior consultant in the department in question to explain the project and ask if I 
could come in for a meeting. All of the senior consultants I approached agreed to the 
participation of their department. When I arrived on the day of the study, usually for 
the first joint meeting in the morning, the senior consultant would typically point out 
the doctors I could possibly follow, and I then asked these medics for permission to 
do so and obtained their written, informed consent. None of these doctors refused to 
participate, although it was certainly possible that they were unlikely to do so once 
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the senior consultant had assigned this task to them. Overall, 17 doctors were 
included in the first study, five female and 12 male, varying considerably in age and 
medical experience. Each doctor was normally observed for one workday, lasting 
between six and nine hours. The study was conducted in hospital departments and the 
offices of general practitioners in six different locations in Northern Norway. 
 
2.1.5. Coding and analysis 
I began my analysis as soon as I had written out my notes from the first observation 
session and interview. Even though this initial data contained my observations of 
only a single doctor, there were still many different consultations and situations to 
examine. I started by going through the data sentence by sentence, comparing 
incidents and coding openly without restrictions in terms of any theme. In line with 
the Grounded Theory approach, I constantly asked of the data “what is happening 
here?” and “what category does this incident indicate?” In this way, I tried to not only 
interpret concrete actions or words, but to also conceptualise the meaning thereof. 
Where I had written in my notes that the doctor addressed me before the patient 
entered the room, saying, “The next patient has some psychological issues, she is a 
bit peculiar”, I could, for instance, code this as “doctor classifying patient”. Going 
through the text, I coded and conceptualised incidents and compared incidents with 
other incidents, looking for similarities and differences between them. Later on in the 
text, where I had written that the doctor smiled after the patient had left, saying “That 
was a consultation, like, ‘Could I have a sick note if I ever need it, just in case’!” this 
was also coded as “classifying”, but now as “doctor classifying situation”. Thus, both 
similarities and differences between incidents were noted when constantly comparing 
them. The properties of each category also gradually accumulated during this 
analysis. For instance, when it came to the concept of “categorising”, I would note 
how some patients were labelled negatively and others positively. It is of course 
possible that I sometimes interpreted a gesture, action or phrase in a way other than 
what was intended by the participants, even if I strived not to. However, since the 
analysis rested on numerous situations with different doctors and different patients, 
an occasional misinterpretation was unlikely to affect the end result. 
  
After spending some time on open coding, I found that the data generated fewer and 
fewer new codes. Most of the text was now being coded using my established 
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categories, which each had various properties attached to it and thus extended to 
cover a large number of incidents. This development took place gradually, and after 
having observed ten of the participating doctors, I switched to a more selective 
coding process. This process focused on what I perceived to be the most important 
codes in the analysis. On the basis of the identified categories and the relationship 
between them, we then established the core category, which is the one that appeared 
to be central to the emerging theory and could best explain what actually happened in 
the field. In this first study, we initially chose “medical reconstruction” as the core 
category, which was intended to describe how the doctors first deconstructed the 
patients’ problems, redefined the pieces and reconstructed them into a specific 
medical complaint. However, on conferring with Barney Glaser at an advanced 
Grounded Theory seminar, he suggested changing the core category to 
“essentialising", which reflects how the doctors focused on what seemed to be 
essential to their specific objective while neglecting other dimensions. This concept 
was not only potentially more illuminating as the core of the emerging theory, but 
was also more general and applicable to similar processes outside the field of 
medicine. Accordingly, after choosing the core category, I delimited my coding to the 
other categories that seemed to be related to it and were the most important in the 
data. This left me with 20-30 conceptual codes. I went through the data again, this 
time focusing only on these particular categories, conducting selective coding to 
enable me to add cumulative properties thereto and discover the theoretical 
relationship between them. Later, these sub-categories were reduced to five main 
categories in order to delimit the theory. These were: “breaking down”; 
“concretising”; “categorising”; “existential filtering”; and “functional focus”, and 
were in addition to the core category of essentialising. This theoretical structure was 
defining for the configuration of the first manuscript, in which each of these 
categories was explained and clarified with empirical examples. 
 
While this analysis slowly advanced, I continued to observe and interview new 
doctors. This move between data collection and analysis was very valuable when it 
came to conceptualising the data. In particular, it enabled me to check my formulated 
categories and interpretations and develop the concepts that seemed to be the most 
valuable. It prevented excessive speculation or theorising and ensured that the 
analysis and emerging theory remained close to the data. The alternation between 
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gathering empirical data and theoretically analysing it also generated a lot of ideas 
and thoughts about: the data; why the doctors and patients acted like they did; how 
the different concepts and parts of the analysis were related; the different aspects of 
theory that I had studied earlier; and similar findings elsewhere, or even links to 
phenomena in completely different sections of society. I tried to capture these ideas 
in the form of the brief, explanatory notes that Grounded Theory describes as 
“memos”. Writing memos is an important part of the method, and it is emphasised 
that when the researcher gets an idea about the data, he or she must always interrupt 
other work to write a memo about it. Memo writing stimulates researchers’ creativity, 
encourages theoretical analysis and exposes personal conceptualisations and 
interpretations of the material. These memos were thus added to the data and 
analysed and interpreted in relation to the rest of the information we had collected. 
 
I used the NVivo 7 analysis tool, which is computer software for qualitative data 
analysis, to assist with the coding and systemising of categories and memos (Gibbs, 
2002). The kind of software is designed to organise and analyse unstructured data, 
although there is some reluctance to use it in Grounded Theory circles due to fears 
that it takes the focus off the collected data and the scenarios observed by occupying 
the researcher’s mind with computer tasks. Furthermore, the manner in which the 
software is structured, the opportunities it provides to make notes and links, and its 
preset categories force researchers to organise data in a predetermined manner that is 
contrary to the aim of the Grounded Theory method. While I believe that these are 
fair reasons to be cautious about the use of data analysis software, it is my view that 
the advantages outweigh the risks. Some of the concerns are related to a lack of 
experience in using the software. Normally, however, the more you use a computer 
program, the more you will be able to master it as a tool for your own purposes 
instead of being led by its innate possibilities. For example, while writing on the 
computer in Microsoft Word might have obstructed my text when I was 
inexperienced in using the program, now it is just as easy (or even easier) to work in 
this way as opposed to writing by hand. In addition, there was a large advantage in 
using the software to keep track of my coding. When there are hundreds of codes, 
categories and memos, the need to ensure that they are maintained in an accessible 
system is considerable. So, my primary use of the program was as a way of keeping 
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track of my analysis and displaying the links between related situations and 
connected categories. 
 
2.1.6. Summary of the first manuscript 
In our first study, what was most striking was how alike the doctors’ approaches to 
their patients were, despite major differences between individual medics and medical 
settings. I followed general practitioners of both sexes, different ages and with 
varying experience, and their style of doing medicine obviously differed. Some were 
efficient, worked fast, concentrated on test results and notes and did not chat a great 
deal to their patients. Others were more laid-back, kept on friendly terms with the 
patients and referred to their personal experiences. Yet, when it came to what the 
doctors focused on, what held their attention and what they disregarded, their clinical 
approaches were surprisingly similar, and we have thus tried to describe five of the 
most important elements thereof. When the patients told their medical story, the 
doctors were not particularly interested in the narrative element, but in the medical 
facts and clues that it contained. This often caused them to either interrupt with 
specific questions or ask the patients to repeat parts of the story. We described this 
step as break down to describe how the doctors concentrated on getting a grasp of the 
elements of medical information contained in a story by breaking down the patient’s 
presentation of events. The doctors also often interrupted to get the patients to specify 
their complaints or describe what had actually happened, a step we called 
concretising. The doctors made a lot of effort to ensure that the complaints, findings 
or events were objective and measurable. This could be as simple as asking when the 
patient took a last dose of medicine, but might also involve quantifying the distances 
that patients were able to walk or levels of pain they were experiencing. The doctors 
likewise strove to interpret the meaning of the diverse information they received from 
both the patient and any examinations, assessing this from a medical point of view. 
We called this step categorising, in which events and findings are classified 
according to medical knowledge and clinical language. So, a patient’s description of 
a feeling in her chest is categorised as “chest pain” or even “angina”; a cold foot is 
described as “poorly circulated”; and a patient is noted as being “depressive”. These 
three steps can be seen as normal aspects of the medical processing that doctors 
conduct to utilise their specific medical knowledge to help patients with their diverse 
and often diffuse problems, and would probably not be very surprising to clinicians. 
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Yet, this medical processing also contained other elements that are normally less 
explicit, but are nonetheless related to the steps already described. An example was 
when the doctors strove to convert patients’ afflictions into a medically relevant 
question by breaking up the narrative and concretising and categorising the 
information. This meant that their connection to their patients’ personal lives got 
rather lost; the personal meaning of an illness and the patient’s private feelings were 
not incorporated in the medical question, and were even actively excluded. We called 
this step existential filtering. For instance, a patient might be disconsolate because her 
painful shoulder makes it impossible for her to help her elderly mother with the 
housework. The doctor, however, would probably take no notice of this, perhaps even 
ignoring the patient’s personal distress in order to focus on the delimited medical 
affliction. The doctors’ medical decisions were not focused on the patients’ expressed 
worries, but rather on a medically relevant question that could be answered by the use 
of medical knowledge that is based on anatomy, physiology and the functions of the 
body’s systems. We named this step functional focus, because the doctors seemed to 
concentrate their efforts on improving the functional health of the patients physically 
and, sometimes, mentally. While we divided the doctors’ clinical approaches into five 
discernable steps in order to better understand their actions, in reality these are all 
mixed up and some even occur simultaneously. However, together they constitute the 
elements of a systematic medical process that we called essentialising, which is 
intended to describe doctors’ practical ways of handling complex and often 
ambiguous clinical situations in a medical manner, thereby establishing what they 
perceive to be the purpose of clinical intervention.  
 
2.1.7. Reactions to the first study 
Not all of our conclusions from the first study were very popular with the doctors. 
When we presented the results in various fora, they would generally recognise the 
process of essentialising in the way they handled their patients, but many objected to 
the concept of existential filtering, and particularly so the general practitioners. They 
claimed that they dealt with their patients as complete individuals, and related to their 
personal lives as well as treating their medical afflictions. This should not perhaps 
come as a surprise. Stating that doctors do not genuinely care for their patients as 
human beings is bound to upset those who strive to do so because they believe it is a 
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necessary part of being a good doctor. This reaction could, in fact, reflect our 
research findings. Since we found that most doctors were driven by a moral 
obligation (to benefit their patients’ health), it is no wonder that criticising doctors’ 
work is met with moral indignation. On the other hand, we were somewhat surprised 
by the reactions because we did not intend to criticise them, but to instead illuminate 
why it is so hard to meet the moral ideals of a good doctor. 
 
Indeed, we do not disapprove of the doctors’ essentialising processes, but describe 
how they occur and highlight the rationale behind them, namely a moral obligation to 
improve patient health. Essentialising might be an indispensable element of the 
clinical encounter if doctors are to practice medicine in the way we understand this 
profession to be. Modern medical practice is so profoundly bound up with medical 
science and knowledge of anatomy, physiology and biology that it is hard to see how 
doctors could ever avoid analysing patients as medical objects if they are to apply this 
medical knowledge to their patients’ bodies. Accordingly, our theory says something 
about how the premises for clinical work restrict what doctors are able to do. The 
process of essentialising explains why it is so difficult for doctors to care for patients 
holistically, and why this is perhaps not even desirable given the primary 
responsibilities of the profession. Moreover, the process may shed light on why some 
patients feel that they are not adequately met or cared for as human beings. In 
summary, the theory illustrates how the medical profession is constantly torn between 
the responsibility to improve patient health and care for them as human beings. What 
is more, it may even alleviate some of the worries for not being a good enough 
doctor. However, as it turned out, many of the doctors included in the study would 
not accept our conclusions and instead maintained that they attended to their patients 
as individuals and cared for them in a holistic manner. 
 
This reaction puzzled us. Our theory felt certain and grounded in the meticulously 
acquired data, and most of the doctors also seemed to recognise the patterns of 
essentialising that existed in their own work. So, why was there this opposition to the 
notion of “existential filtering”? There were several potential answers, the first of 
which was the possibility that our theory was wrong in relation to this aspect of the 
doctors’ performances and we had misjudged the observational and interview data. 
Researchers must always be open to this possibility, but even though we conducted 
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two more days of observations and interviews, we could not interpret the data in any 
other way: the existential filtering conducted by the doctors seemed to be systematic 
and evident. Another explanation was that the doctors were wrong in claiming that 
they cared for their patients as human beings. In other words, it might be the case that 
they were denying our theory because it threatened their image of the medical 
profession, since they could not regard themselves as good doctors if they did not 
care for patients existentially; compassion and empathy are widely held to be 
important elements of a patient-doctor relationship, and our study questioned this 
notion. Indeed, in Norway, general practitioners often express their ideological 
foundation by the words Continuous, Extensive, Personal and Binding [Kontinuerlig, 
Omfattende, Personlig og Forpliktende] (Alment praktiserende lægers forening, 
1978). Alternatively, perhaps the doctors had not fully understood that the description 
of essentialising was not a criticism of their work, but an explanation of the premises 
of clinical practice. Nonetheless, it would have been rather arrogant to explain away 
the complaints by stating that the doctors had misunderstood our arguments or did not 
want to face the truth. So, why do doctors believe that they take existential care of 
their patients as well as medical? This question continued to bother us after we had 
concluded the first study. 
 
2.2. Study II 
2.2.1. Remains of the data  
After writing the first manuscript, the original plan was to go into the field again to 
collect more material and conduct further analysis. As mentioned earlier, I collected 
data from two more general practitioners after saturation of the first study. This was 
done in part to test our theory of essentialising against the critics who maintained that 
doctors do care for their patients as human beings. However, the settings and 
circumstances were now so familiar that I could only see further confirmation of our 
already established theory; our theory of the subject was so saturated that more 
observations did not seem to bring anything new to the table. On the other hand, the 
material we had collected was so rich and complex that we had barely scratched the 
surface, and there were many interesting and remarkable aspects of it that could be 
analysed independently of the theory of essentialising. 
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One such aspect was the practicality of clinical work. Often, medical practice and the 
patient-doctor relationship are discussed in slightly ethereal terms, which focus on the 
sanctity of professional secrecy in a relationship that is based on empathy or the 
mystery of the human body. Even when not explicitly mentioned, these dimensions 
are often implied in the argument (Thomasma & Kissell, 2000). Yet, when you 
observe doctors at work, everything is very practical and concrete to the extent that it 
is hard to see where the more existential dimensions of life even enter medicine in 
practice. It is also difficult to identify the moral aspects of doctors’ work or define 
their moral choices. This often makes it a challenge to relate discussions in medical 
ethics to common clinical settings, and can sometimes even obscure the issue. The 
tendency to speak about clinical practice using a particular form of jargon may be 
ascribed to the medical field being relatively difficult to access for non-medical 
outsiders. However, over the course of the last decade, an increasing number of 
empirical studies have been undertaken in the field of bioethics, and a vital 
contribution thereof is to correct misapprehensions about the medical profession and 
the field of medicine. 
 
2.2.2. Preface to the second study 
One of our discoveries from the data that had already been collected was the 
suggestion that doctors were chiefly driven by a responsibility to improve their 
patients’ health. This strong moral motivation behind their clinical work was 
surprising, and it also seemed to override other moral values, such as justice or 
patient autonomy. Nevertheless, in medical ethics, beneficence is not appraised as 
being the most important value. In “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009), beneficence is one of the four prima facie principles, although in 
practice it is often assigned a lesser status because the greatest weight is usually 
attached to the principle of respect for autonomy. Indeed, this latter principle often 
seems to trump other values in bioethical discourse, referring to human rights or the 
rationale of informed consent. Beneficence, on the other hand, is sometimes 
portrayed as being morally ambiguous, thus emphasising the short step from it to 
paternalism, a concept which has clearly negative connotations (Gillon, 2003). So, 
how can the value of beneficence be such a vital part of medical practice when its 
importance is not reflected in the medical ethics discourse and the principle is even, 
to some extent, discredited in line with paternalism? 
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In medical ethics, the discussion is often polarised between the value of autonomy 
and the value of beneficence. While the doctor may know what treatment will 
probably benefit his patient the most, it is up to the autonomous patient to decide 
whether or not to comply with it. In line with the development of the rest of society 
and the influence of human rights, respecting the autonomy of the patient has become 
morally important. However, in medical ethics’ discourse, the notion of patient 
autonomy has been given a more specific meaning, namely that of autonomous 
choice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009, p. 100). Accentuating the importance of this 
has led medical ethics discourse to formulate distinct moral problems, such as how to 
attend to the autonomy of non-autonomous individuals through living wills, proxy 
decision-makers and substituted judgements (Maclean, 
2006; Sulmasy & Snyder, 2010). It has also created an ideal of “shared decision-
making”, where doctors and patients discuss treatment on equal terms, sometimes 
reducing the former to a medical counsellor who informs the latter about his or her 
condition and leaves it up to the individual to decide the approach to be taken 
(Falkum & Førde, 2001; Sandman & Munthe, 2010). However, there has also been 
widespread criticism of the notion of respecting a patient’s right to autonomous 
choice. This criticism has particularly addressed the American cultural interpretation 
of autonomy and patients’ lack of capacity and knowledge to make truly autonomous 
decisions (Holm, 1995; Pellegrino, 2006). Yet, in the light of our empirical data, we 
struggled with an even more basic issue: what is an autonomous choice in clinical 
practice? What does this concept mean? We had previously found it difficult to 
identify doctors’ moral choices, and it was now equally challenging to define 
patients’ autonomous choices. Again, it seemed as if the language of medical ethics 
had created an image of clinical work that was, perhaps, as obtuse as it was revealing. 
Indeed, when we observed doctors’ clinical work, there were very few situations that 
could be labelled as “respecting a patient’s autonomous choice”, even when the 
patient was more or less directing the course of action. Overall, the very notion of 
“choice” is not easily interpreted in clinical practice. This is because the decisions to 
be made are often complex (what examinations to undertake, what treatments to 
commence), and the actions of both patient and doctor, as well as other health care 
personnel, are deeply intertwined in a way that can obscure who really decided what. 
The medical ethics literature is strong on the issue of respecting patients’ autonomous 
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choice, but if it was so simple and so obviously a matter of morals, why would 
doctors defy it? These questions led us to the second manuscript, in which we wanted 
to shed light on the concept of choice in a health care setting by drawing upon our 
empirical data.  
2.2.3. Summary of the second manuscript 
Our intention with this manuscript was to use the empirical data collected for the first 
study as a basis for the closer investigation of the concept of autonomous choice as it 
is described in the medical ethics literature. It is an empirical investigation in the 
sense that observation and interview data constitute the main sources of reflection. 
Despite this, it is not traditional empirical research because we did not collect any 
new data. Instead, using data from the first study along with our own practical 
knowledge of the field, this study is a systematic, theoretical reflection upon concrete 
medical practice as it is exercised in everyday life. In the course of our empirical 
examination of how moral values are tacitly handled in medical practice, we found it 
to be important to illustrate a key lacuna between medical practice and bioethical 
discourse. Accordingly, in the second study, we aimed to demonstrate how the 
bioethical focus on autonomous choice misrepresents the moral aspects at play in this 
setting.  
 
The first problem with the notion of autonomous choice is in identifying what really 
constitutes a choice. Although patients are predominantly free to refuse medical 
interventions, the cases where a patient gets to choose openly between two or more 
clear options are, in fact, rare. Indeed, health care is difficult to describe in terms of 
the separate elements of a decision; it is a much more dynamic process which 
develops over time. What we normally think of as a single action often actually 
consists of a series of actions, like taking an X-ray, operating, or following up on 
high blood pressure. Furthermore, it is often inaccurate to speak of a single person or 
a single intention behind a course of action, since providing health care for one 
particular patient generally involves many different people who act in accordance 
with each other and lay the premises for the actions of others. Accordingly, to 
investigate or treat a patient is a collaborative act wherein many people are involved 
in the planning. 
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On the other hand, if we look at cases in which patients really are given a clear choice 
between two options, it is still rather misleading to portray this as the signpost of 
respecting patient autonomy. This is because we do not have knowledge of all of the 
decisions that the doctors have made in order to present these options to the patient. 
Since health care is a continuous process involving many people over time, any 
attempt to break it down into aspects of decisions is bound to be somewhat arbitrary 
or artificial. The mere presence of a choice does not ensure the empowerment of 
patients. 
 
Another factor that reduces the availability and perhaps even the desirability of 
choice in health care is the very purpose of medical practice, which is aimed at 
improving patient health. Accordingly, within the health care system, patients are not 
free to choose a course of action that is unlikely to improve their health, whether 
mentally or physically. Indeed, if a procedure is either clearly beneficial or harmful to 
a patient, it cannot be put forward as a matter of choice. This means that only the 
procedures that have a limited or uncertain effect are on offer. 
 
In addition, it is important to bear in mind that clinical decisions do not occur in a 
vacuum. Although the form of organisation may vary between countries, professional 
medical treatment occurs within the organisation of a health care system, which 
entails many practical factors and limitations that also affect medical decisions. These 
factors are not only financial considerations, but also available staff, access to 
equipment, administrative policy, infrastructure, distance to specialists and so on, all 
of which can have a profound impact on the choices that are open to both patients and 
doctors. 
 
Our point is not to demonstrate that patient choice is a superfluous concept in health 
care or patient autonomy is not important. Instead, we want to shed light on the 
concept of autonomous choice that has gained so much attention in the medical ethics 
discourse yet is somehow poorly grounded in medical practice. While it seems easy 
to argue in favour of the importance of autonomous choice in principle, it is difficult 
to understand the moral implications in practice. The concept, originally taken from 
medical research and its requirement for informed consent, does not properly fit with 
clinical reality. This leads to a misrepresentation of health care practice, which makes 
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it easy to misjudge the moral aspects that are actually involved therein. “The illusion 
of choice” is an expression meant to illustrate how the very concept tricks us into 
thinking in a misleading way about practice. The problem is not only that the concept 
of autonomous choice is overrated as a moral concept in health care practice, but that 
it also masks what is really at stake in caring for patients. 
As with our first manuscript, our intention with the second manuscript was to bring 
normal medical practice into the light by analysing what clinical behaviour and 
activities could mean in a moral language, thus reflecting another part of my original 
question: how do doctors handle the tacit moral dimensions of clinical practice? In 
doing this, we hoped to uncover ways in which our language and theories obstruct 
rather than enable reflection. How we classify our perception of the world and our 
actions within it not only reflects how things really are, but also constitutes a specific 
way of looking at the world and guiding what we do in it. Words are not only words; 
they provide us with certain ways of thinking about a subject. 
 
If our classifications or descriptions of the world are inaccurate or imprecise, they can 
cause difficulties and obscurity rather than enlightenment. This is why we have 
scrutinised the gap between medical ethics and medical practice. If ethical awareness 
is to be more than acting according to a set of predefined rules or moral demands, an 
important undertaking is discerning the essential moral elements of practice. What is 
morally important and what is not? In order to answer this, we have to dissect the 
very meaning of the phenomena. To respect a patient’s autonomous choice in health 
care is sometimes morally important, but sometimes it is not, and it is perhaps even 
often immoral. Theoretical ethics applied incautiously in the field of medicine may 
create discussions that are conceptually detailed and argumentatively sound, but at 
the same time miss the point completely. 
 
2.3. Study III 
2.3.1. Professional responsibility 
Working with the issue of respecting patient choice initiated reflection on the other 
moral demands that are commonly upheld in bioethical discourse. A growing 
humanistic movement in medicine apparently stipulates that doctors engage their 
patients more holistically, rather than just taking care of detached body parts, with 
empathy and understanding being upheld as vital ideals (Epstein, 1999; Sucman et 
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al., 1997). Yet, the results from our first study, which revealed how doctors 
systematically neglect patients’ existential issues, were so far from the empathy ideal 
that we began to wonder what was going wrong. Indeed, in light of what we had 
learned in our research, it was unclear whether doctors could possibly care for 
patients as human beings given the confines of their professional role. By human 
beings, we here refer to the individual humaneness of patients in an existential 
manner, encompassing their intrinsic human value, as opposed to treating patients as 
objects. 
 
When analysing the duties and responsibilities of doctors, one cannot only regard 
them as any other random individual, because their specific role as professionals also 
has to be considered. Patients go to the doctor because they need help with physical 
or mental suffering, and this is what constitutes the fundamental basis for the patient-
doctor relationship. Doctors are taught to help patients on the basis of scientific 
knowledge of the construction and function of the human body, and are supposed to 
use this to help to restore their patients’ health.  
 
The theory we developed in the first study indicated that doctors have to essentialise 
a situation in order to use their medical knowledge and act as doctors. Indeed, 
according to our analysis of the data, the doctors did not consider their patients’ more 
existential values in their reasoning, and so these had no consequences for how the 
medics dealt with the circumstances in front of them. Yet, it is also possible to 
believe that doctors care for the whole patient in addition to essentialising the 
situation. Perhaps they care for the patient as a person at the same time as they 
conduct their clinical analysis? Or perhaps they restore the patient as an individual 
after the essentialising process and the medical decisions have been made? 
 
However, my experiences from the fieldwork suggest that many doctors believe that 
they do care for their patients existentially, even though our studies show that they do 
not. Most of the communication in clinical encounters appears to be clinically 
targeted, and the ways in which doctors approach patients seem to be guided by the 
information they would like to obtain from them or their ability to influence patient 
compliance. There were many cases in which doctors expressed the view that their 
empathic (or sometimes threatening) modus operandi was a conscious way of getting 
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the necessary examinations done.  Moreover, good communication and a holistic 
approach were frequently described as being important because of their positive 
effect on patient health. 
 
2.3.2. Non-instrumental values 
When communication and empathy are utilised by doctors to ensure a favourable 
clinical outcome and, consequently, function as means to improve patient health, they 
lose their own, independent moral values. Empathy in these circumstances would not 
then be an expression of a human relationship, but an aspect of the clinical rationality 
that focuses on improving patients’ mental and physical functions. It is worth noting, 
however, that such an instrumental use of empathy or techniques of clinical 
communication are by no means immoral just because they are instrumental. On the 
contrary, it is important to bear in mind that we found the doctors to be primarily 
motivated by a moral aim to help their patients. Some doctors manage to 
individualise their patient communication and sensibly explore how their patients’ 
social context relate to their illness. Such sensitivity might generate more detailed 
information about medical issues, suggesting possible solutions, mapping out 
patients’ resources and improving patient satisfaction and compliance. In her doctoral 
thesis about female patients’ encounters with general practitioners, Malterud 
established a clinical method including what she called “key questions”, which were 
meant to influence the patient-doctor interaction in such a manner that the position of 
the female patient was strengthened (1990). Her stated reasons for doing so were not 
primarily to strengthen patients’ autonomy, but to improve the doctors’ capability to 
get hold of these patients’ medical concerns and opinions. Malterud compares the 
method to a tool in a medical toolbox that can be used strategically on specific 
indications (Ibid., p. 192). Indeed, the method she here proposes is a very refined 
clinical tool that probably enhances communication and patient cooperation, but it is 
still a method with a clear medical aim: benefiting patients’ health. 
 
For our moral enquiry then, the remaining questions are: are there any non-
instrumental aspects of the patient-doctor relationship, and, if so, what are they? Can 
doctors essentialise a situation and, at the same time, care for other non-instrumental 
values or the more existential aspects of the patient? 
 
 59
Kari Milch Agledahl  Morally bound medical work 
Certainly, doctors do relate to patients as human beings, not as inanimate objects. 
Most greet the patients, shake their hands and generally behave politely. Sometimes 
they also chat about the weather and other issues unrelated to the clinical problem. It 
is, however, worth noting that this form of conversation is often used by doctors as a 
way of evaluating their patients’ general condition, in which case it is actually a part 
of clinical reasoning. Patients rarely enter a consultation as a mere object (although it 
does happen!); they are objectified when doctors go about determining the clinical 
problem. At other times, it is difficult to discern that the doctor has any human 
relationship with the patient at all. This is especially true when the patient is not 
present, such as during ward sitting rounds or when doctors confer with each other. 
Indeed, if existential values play any part in doctors’ clinical reasoning, you would 
expect to find them in evidence when they discuss their patients with others, but in 
our study, we did not. When doctors talk about non-medical aspects of a patient, 
these comments are left out of the clinical discussion. 
 
2.3.3. Professional empathy? 
Professional medicine appears to be linked to the process of essentialising, in which 
patients’ existential values have no independent significance. The concept of 
essentialising includes communication and empathetic approaches to patients when 
they are intended to improve the clinical utility of the encounter; indeed, 
individualising medical care is seen as an important asset of a good doctor. However, 
existential values are left out of the clinical question. Moreover, attending to a patient 
as a fellow human being seems to vary a great deal between doctors, and is perhaps 
more related to each medic’s set of personal moral values. Perhaps, when doctors 
meet and acknowledge their patients as fellow human beings, they do not act 
primarily as professionals, but by virtue of being human. If so, the two systems of 
personal and professional values may collide. The personal set of values that leads 
doctors to treat others, including patients, as human beings, may vary between 
different people. In addition, doctors have another responsibility imposed upon them 
by their profession, namely the duty to benefit patients’ health. The relationship with 
a patient is based on a doctor’s professional role, and it seems that this professional 
element takes precedence when the two systems of values clash. Consequently, 
doctors’ moral practices will always remain in a delicate balance between human and 
professional considerations. The more doctors attend to patients’ personal values, the 
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further they move away from their professional role. Indeed, in order to be able to 
handle a situation medically, doctors need to let professional considerations 
overshadow the immediate human aspects of the circumstances they are dealing with. 
According to this, it is vital to differentiate between empathy as a part of clinical 
reasoning and empathy as an independent recognition of the patient’s existential 
value. This is because, as an independent value, empathy is actually in opposition to 
essentialising and clinical reasoning. This issue is of central importance, because it 
indicates to what extent and in what ways it is possible to teach doctors and medical 
students to be more empathic as professionals. It is also vital when it comes to 
evaluating the extent to which we actually want doctors to care for patients 
existentially, because if they do it might be at the expense of professional conduct. 
 
2.3.4. Planning the third study 
In our third study, we wanted to focus on doctors’ care for their patients. Do doctors 
care in any way other than medically? Do doctors care for patients as fellow human 
beings? We originally planned to conduct another round of data gathering with 
observations and interviews in line with the first study. However, before we started 
the fieldwork, we received an offer to make use of a large amount of video-recorded 
patient consultations which had already been collected for another study on patient 
communication. 
 
Following the RCT “Better clinical communication in hospitals” research, which was 
financed as a PhD project by the South-Eastern Norway Regional Health Authority, 
Bård Fossli Jensen and Pål Gulbrandsen collected 500 videotapes from encounters 
between 71 doctors and their patients in Akershus University Hospital in the period 
April 2007-June 2008 (Fossli et al., 2010). The study group was randomly drawn 
from the population of doctors working in clinical non-psychiatric departments as of 
February 2007, and very few declined to participate. The material represents a 
convenience-based sample of outpatient consultations, encounters at admittance and 
discharge, bedside encounters on rounds, and times when doctors were performing 
diagnostic procedures (EKG, EMG, echocardiography etc). The data were collected 
as part of an intervention study wherein doctors were given a 20-hour course in 
clinical communication. Informed consent was provided by the patients involved, 
who were able to choose between imposing a limitation on the intervention study and 
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agreeing to “studies on dialogues between doctors and patients” up to 2020. Very few 
patients limited their consent. The intention of the study was to use the collected data 
in different research settings to describe and understand the processes that are 
ongoing in medical encounters in hospital, including ethical, sociological, medical, 
ethnic, quality and safety issues. The sample is probably the largest hospital-based, 
cross-specialty, representative material of its kind in the world. 
 
It soon became clear that access to these data would complement our own material in 
a constructive way. One of the objections that we had faced after the first study was 
related to the method of data collection, since we had relied on observations and 
interviews carried out by a single individual, without employing any form of direct 
recording other than written notes. Some complained that this made the data highly 
subjective in that we could not be certain that others would have interpreted the 
circumstances in the same way and we were also unable to reproduce the findings, 
and using video-recorded encounters would indeed answer this criticism. This 
material would enable us to reproduce the findings, have different people watch and 
analyse the same encounters and, consequently, permit there to be a comparison of 
our interpretations of what was going on. It would also make it possible to review the 
consultations repeatedly if the dialogue was unclear or if anything particularly 
important or surprising happened. 
 
2.3.5. Selection of data 
We decided to go through a random sample from all of the video consultations that 
lasted less than 20 minutes. The reason for this was that many of the encounters that 
lasted longer than 20 minutes contained long periods of examination that were not 
visible on the tape. This was because the video recorder was placed in one location in 
the examination room, usually before the patient entered, with the intended focus 
being on the communication between doctor and patient. Accordingly, if the patients 
were examined on an examination table, they often moved out of the frame of the 
video recorder and were not visible on screen. This was done partly for practical 
purposes and partly as a way of protecting patient privacy as much as possible in the 
setting. Another problem with the longer recordings was the poor sound quality 
during the examinations that took place out of sight of the video equipment. Since 
most of the taped consultations lasted less than 20 minutes we decided to eliminate 
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the longest encounters to avoid spending a lot of time on those that were difficult to 
study. We were aware that this choice might introduce a selection bias, because it is 
possible that patients were better cared for in the consultations that took the longest 
time. However, we have reason to believe that this did not in fact have any major 
impact on our analysis. Firstly, as already explained, the extra time was often spent 
on examinations rather than on communicating with patients. Secondly, we observed 
that even when the doctors had plenty of time (and explicitly stated this to be the 
case) they did not use this on the patients’ personal issues. Finally, since we had 
already conducted an observation study in which consultations of all lengths were 
included, we did also have experience with longer encounters and the impact of time 
on patient care. What we did, however, notice was a difference in the very shortest 
consultations, where there were generally poorer levels of communication and the 
patients were more objectified. We also restricted ourselves to the encounters that 
were taped before the participating doctors had undertaken the course in clinical 
communication, since this intervention might have affected how they cared for their 
patients. 
 
We applied for and were granted ethical approval for the study on the basis of the 
patients’ broad consent. The recordings were stored as an enciphered file in an 
external database at the Akershus University Hospital Research Centre and we had to 
be physically present there to watch them. 
 
2.3.6. Method 
Since we planned to elaborate on the findings from the first study, and because we 
had had positive experiences with the method we used therein, we wanted to use 
Grounded Theory on this new material. Moreover, changing the mode of data 
collection would not pose any difficulties to the Grounded Theory approach, since 
one of its main doctrines is “all is data”. What might, however, have been 
problematic was the fact that we were now approaching the field with a more 
concrete research question relating to how doctors cared for their patients, instead of 
having an open approach as the method explicitly requires. Yet, this new work was 
really an extension of the initial study and an attempt to develop and tease out the 
nuances of concepts that were already established. Accordingly, we decided that it 
was legitimate to proceed with the Grounded Theory approach. Moreover, the new 
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research question was not a preconceived, theoretical query, but had emerged after 
thorough work with data from the field. Although renowned philosophers have 
written about caring and empathy in medical ethics, we did not use these theories to 
explore the material, but instead we made an effort to stay grounded in the empirical 
data and open to new possibilities and unexpected answers to our questions. 
 
We conducted the study in much the same way as we had with the first. I travelled to 
Akershus University Hospital Research Centre and looked through the taped 
consultations while taking notes. I watched most consultations only once, trying not 
to get caught up in the possibility of reproducing every incident, but to remain 
focused on the core question: what is happening in this setting? More specifically, I 
had listed some elements that might get us closer to providing an answer to our 
research question: 
 
• Do the doctors care for or touch upon existential values in their conversations 
with their patients? Are the patients’ personal experiences and values taken into 
account? 
• Are existential values given any value beyond their medical significance, for 
instance as symptoms of depression? 
• Do the patients’ personal values affect his or her treatment, especially in 
consultations with those who are chronically ill, seriously ill or dying? 
• How do the doctors display signs that they are treating the patients as individual 
human beings? 
• To what extent are the patients treated only as objects? How does this 
transformation from person to medical object take place? 
• After objectifying a patient, thus in a sense ruining the human relationship, do the 
doctors do anything to restore this relationship with the patient? 
• How do the patients react to being objectified, especially in vulnerable situations? 
 
The plan was to watch a large number of consultations instead of discussing only a 
few of them in detail. Initially, I watched each encounter once, repeating parts only if 
the setting was unclear. I took notes of situations which were particularly interesting, 
illustrative or incomprehensible in light of the research questions, and I also noted 
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seemingly deviating events or incidents that suggested a novel explanation. I likewise 
recorded the specific points in the consultations where existential dimensions or 
caring for patients as human beings were apparent. 
 
Even though we intended to collect data in much the same way as for the first study, 
the setting was now quite different; I did not have to sit in the corner of a doctor’s 
office, trying to be invisible and not disturb the consultation in any way. Instead, I sat 
in an ordinary office, drinking coffee, taking notes openly, reacting to extraordinary 
events and stopping the tape whenever I needed to. This had both a positive and a 
negative influence on the data collection. The advantages are obvious: I could relax, 
take breaks and write openly. I could also rewind and watch interesting parts over and 
over again, and could even get the precise wording correct and return later to re-
watch a consultation after having reflected upon it. I could not, however, see beyond 
the frame of the video recorder, which meant that I could not see the entire room and 
I could not follow the action when the patient or doctor moved, for instance, to the 
examination table. The doctors’ work between encounters was also missing, and so I 
was unable to put the consultations in their proper context. Each scenario began with 
a doctor meeting a patient in a set location, and this setting had the capacity to 
accentuate the feeling of repetition and routine work. Watching consultations on a 
screen also meant that I felt more distanced from the encounters. This may have 
contributed to a more objective analysis, but it also meant missing out on the 
atmosphere and feelings that these meetings evoked in me personally, which is also a 
source of data to be analysed. 
 
I arranged three visits to the research centre, watching 30-40 video encounters each 
time. In between visits I worked with my field notes, analysing them in relation to the 
first study and in line with the Grounded Theory approach. In this way, I was able to 
switch between data collection and theoretical analysis in a favourable manner, 
although we did not use theoretical sampling in this study due to the fixed nature of 
the material. After I had sat through 101 video encounters, I felt that the emerging 
theory was quite saturated, and new consultations were not suggesting any novel, 
significant aspects. After my initial examination of the tapes, I paid four more visits 
to the research centre to review certain consultations and write down precise passages 
of conversation for illustration purposes. Two of the other authors of this work, Pål 
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Gulbrandsen and Reidun Førde, watched a sample of the data independently, and the 
former also watched some of the tapes with me while we discussed our analysis of 
the encounters. The emerging theory was developed with my supervisor, Åge 
Wifstad. During the analysis, I singled out specific consultations that were good 
illustrations of the emerging concepts of the developing theory. All of the four 
authors of this work watched these consultations together and discussed their 
interpretation. Despite differences in background and clinical experience, we were 
united in our analysis, a sign of high inter-rater agreement. 
 
2.3.7. Summary of the third manuscript 
Our empirical exploration of the tacit values of medical practice had caused us to 
describe the process of essentialising, during which the personal and human 
dimensions of patient suffering were systematically overlooked. In order to scrutinise 
this rather controversial finding, our aim in the third study was to focus on the tacit 
dimensions of how doctors care for their patients by analysing how this care was 
reflected in their actual medical practice. 
 
It was also obvious in this study that the doctors were primarily concerned with 
improving their patients’ health. This is perhaps not very surprising, since this is a 
key and formal responsibility of the medical profession, but the extent to which this 
medical focus formed the consultation was still remarkable. Most doctors were very 
dominant in the consultations, despite an often friendly tone. With their presentation 
style, attitude, gestures, wording and forthright instructions, the doctors directed the 
consultations firmly. They often indicated when the patients could sit, when they 
could talk and on what subject, when they should be quiet and when they should 
leave. Even if the doctors started out with an open question, they would quickly 
answer or dismiss their patients’ questions and continue with what they regarded as 
the medical issue. Again, it was not the patients’ problems that seemed to be in focus 
of the consultations, but the doctors’ problem, i.e. the medical problem, as initiated 
by the patients. 
 
Once more, we observed that the patients’ more existential needs or feelings were 
generally neglected. Patients often tried to raise their concerns or reflect upon how 
their illness was related to their personal life, but these attempts were usually brushed 
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aside with a smile or a shrug or were simply ignored. The doctors in this study also 
seemed to be primarily interested in their patients as medical objects. However, in the 
third study, we noticed how the doctors made small talk during these encounters, 
which seemed to reveal another aspect of the patient-doctor relationship. We found 
that conversing lightly, acting politely and maintaining a friendly tone were 
prominent features of the doctors’ behaviour. These are general signs of respect for 
another individual, and so the doctors could indeed be said to be attending to the 
humaneness of their patients. Accordingly, in this study, how the doctors maintained 
a relationship with their patients by acting courteously became clearer. This 
courteousness, while not reflecting any deeper concern for the life of the particular 
patient, displayed a general respect for the patient as a fellow human being. Patients 
were not treated only as medical objects or mechanical bodies; the doctors’ social 
interactions affirmed their human relationship with their patients. Yet, at the same 
time, and as noted above, the doctors neglected their patients’ more private sides. So, 
despite smiling, chatting and maintaining a good tone, they ignored patients’ 
expressed personal concerns and did not go into any existential dimension or 
meaning of their illnesses. This duality in the doctors’ approach was quite evident 
once we had discerned it. It would thus both be wrong to claim that doctors care for 
patients as human beings and that they do not; to clarify the issue, we need to be 
more specific about what we mean by “care for” and “as human beings”. 
 
Maintaining some sort of superficial human relationship with a client is a familiar 
issue within many different professions. Yet clinical medicine differs in vital respects 
from other professional-client relationships, since it is the patient himself, or more 
specifically the patient’s body, that is the problem. The patient thus has to present 
himself for scrutiny by the doctor in order to get help. Moreover, because attending to 
the patient’s body as a medical object is likely to be an unavoidable part of the 
clinical encounter, it is perhaps of even greater importance that the doctor also 
emphasises the human connections with the patient. In these circumstances, doctors’ 
courteousness might restore the relationship with their patients, which is constantly 
under pressure because of the objectivation that goes on. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the ways in which doctors both chat in a friendly manner to patients, at 
the same time as inspecting their bodily functions, confuses patients because of the 
mixed signals that are given out. Doctors’ courteousness may in some cases mask 
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their purposeful interventions and the essentialising process. When doctors appear to 
be friendly, fellow human beings, it might be perceived as even more surprising and 
offensive when they do not want to hear about patients’ personal suffering. 
 
In our data we observed how doctors spoke in a friendly and medically correct 
manner to patients who were dying of cancer without ever addressing the fears that 
were expressed. We also saw patients who spoke of the relationship between their 
illness and their deceased spouses and were ignored by the doctors. We likewise 
observed doctors who were very friendly and forthcoming, but never got to the 
bottom of the patients’ enquiries because the medics paid no attention to the related 
existential issues. 
 
The doctors’ care for their patients as individuals thus seems to have at least three 
dimensions. Firstly, there is the medical concern, which is constitutive of the patient-
doctor relationship and based upon a humane and moral duty to relieve patients of 
their suffering and restore their health. Secondly, there is the demonstration of 
general courteousness, maintaining social contact with their patients and showing 
respect for their integrity as human beings. Thirdly, there is the existential care for 
patients as individuals which includes their feelings and private values. In our study, 
we found that all of the doctors displayed medical concern for their patients; almost 
all exhibited courteousness (although the amount varied); and hardly any displayed 
existential care. This demonstrates that the question of whether doctors care for 
patients as human beings is too complex for a yes or no answer. If we demand that 
doctors care more for their patients as individuals, we must specify in what way we 
want them to care. Likewise, when patients feel that they are not being cared for by 
the doctor, what aspect of caring is being referred to? 
 
I suspect that many doctors often intuitively think that good communication is the 
same as caring for patients. Being polite, looking at patients while talking to them, 
and letting them formulate their own questions are indeed ways of showing respect 
for them as fellow human beings and is certainly positive. However, this does not 
nullify the existential neglect that is a part of the process of essentialising. By 
ignoring patients’ expressed existential concerns, doctors disregard their humanity in 
a way that can be morally offensive even if it may be unavoidable. While most 
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patients probably allow for this, those with conditions that fundamentally affect their 
personal lives may be particularly vulnerable. 
 
3. Main findings 
In order to shed light on the gap between medical ethics’ discourse and medical 
practice, our aim with this research was to explore the unspoken moral dimension of 
medical practice. We found the following:  
 
In our first study, we found that doctors deal with patients in a distinct, systematic 
manner, despite individual differences between doctors. We established this as the 
process of essentialising, in which doctors transformed patients’ expressed problems 
into discrete medical questions. This process involved breaking the patient’s story 
down, concretising his or her complaints and categorising the symptoms according to 
a medical interpretation. Patients’ existential meanings were removed, and the focus 
placed on their functioning. 
 
In our second study, we illustrated how a distinct element of bioethical discourse, 
namely that of respecting autonomous choice, is based on a poor conception of 
medical practice. We highlighted that the image of a doctor and his or her patient in 
confidence confronting a medical challenge together is a misrepresentation of actual 
health care practice. Medical decisions are mainly made over a period of time, 
involve several different doctors and other professions, and the options that patients 
are given are rather arbitrarily constructed within the constraints of the organisation 
of the health care system.  
  
In our third study, we further explored doctors’ concern for their patients. We found 
that while patients’ existential meanings were overlooked and the doctors’ main focus 
was on their medical function, the medics did demonstrate considerable 
courteousness. In order to identify how doctors care for patients, our study 
highlighted the importance of discerning between courteousness and existential care. 
Furthermore, doctors’ friendly and jovial attitudes may mask the moral offence of 
disregarding patients’ existential concerns. 
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Taken together, I believe that these three studies have revealed some aspects of the 
tacit moral dimension in medical practice. In particular, we have managed to expose 
some of the premises of doctors’ work and how this affects the values involved. The 
process of essentialising shows how patients’ existential concerns are systematically 
neglected in order to deal with them medically, which might be morally offensive. 
Doctors’ explicit courteousness may alleviate, but also masks, this recurring 
repudiation for both them and their patients. We have also shown how the specific 
social and practical contexts of clinical practice constitute a tacit dimension that 
restricts and shapes clinical work, and that is fundamental to assess the moral values 
that are involved in this work. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this section, I will try to place our research in its proper context. In other words, I 
will present other fields of research that touch upon concepts and theories that are 
similar or relevant to ours. Although a large amount of work has been conducted on 
medical ethics, much of this literature is not pertinent to our discussion of the values 
imbedded in medical care. Instead, I have attempted to contextualise the theoretical 
concepts that have emerged from our studies. 
 
4.1. An internal morality of medicine? 
The concept of essentialising suggests that doctors deal with the moral values present 
in medical practice in a more or less automatic manner, and as an integrated part of 
medical reasoning. In the observed clinical encounters, the doctors hardly ever 
seemed to express their own personal values. Although the level of communication 
with the patients did indeed vary somewhat, what concerned the doctors’ medical 
work was largely guided by a common morality, a form of inner logic within the 
medical field. This moral conduct is not schematised or expressed by the doctors, but 
closely integrated in their medical decisions. In disregarding their patients’ personal 
interpretations, the doctors maintained a strict focus on anatomy and physiological 
function, creating a question with a medical answer in order to improve patient 
health. It should not, of course, be surprising that doctors are focused on improving 
the health of their patients. However, the strength of this moral duty was still 
unexpected, and it directed the entire medical consultation. Indeed, the doctors often 
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seemed to let this moral duty overrule other relevant moral values without any form 
of reflection. This is actually in stark contrast to how the field of medical ethics is 
usually portrayed, in which different moral principles, such as autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, in the four principles approach, are 
weighed against each other. 
 
4.1.1. Medical ethics’ discourse 
Whether or not there is a specific morality that is internal to medicine has long been 
the subject of theoretical discussion in medical ethics. Theorists have tried to specify 
what the proper aims and benefits of medical practice could be, discerning between 
internal and external goods. In 1975, Kass conducted an analysis of “the end of 
medicine” (1975), which was based upon Aristotelian ethics. Yet MacIntyre (1981) is 
thought to have started much of this discussion by claiming that some advanced 
forms of practice have aims and goods that are constitutive or internal to the practice 
thereof, and he also noted that medicine could be an example of such a practice. 
MacIntyre’s notion of internal morality also partially builds on an Aristotelian 
conception of ends, but he sees these as being constituted by society. The medical 
profession is a distinct activity that is constructed by society, and this construction 
incorporates internal moral standards that are not established by each member of the 
profession.  
 
Pellegrino is one of the most prominent advocates of the claim that medicine has an 
internal morality, and he too draws heavily on Aristotle’s teleological ethics. He 
rejects the idea of the internal morality of medicine as a social construct, and claims 
that the ends of medicine are ontologically internal (Pellegrino, 1988). He also 
defines the goal of clinical medicine as the healing of the patient, which is a moral 
aim he regards as being essential to the very idea of medicine. Pellegrino sees the 
clinical encounter as the fundamental phenomenon that defines the morality of 
medicine, and he argues that “Medicine exists because being ill and being healed are 
universal human experiences” (Pellegrino, 2001). These universal experiences are the 
reasons why the medical profession and clinical medicine exist at all. Understood in 
this sense, internal morality does not rely on some external authority, like doctors’ 
personal convictions, societal demands or a professional code of ethics; it is instead 
inherent in the concept of clinical medicine. For Pellegrino, the healing of the patient 
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is taken in its broadest sense. What is medically good for the patient is only one 
aspect of healing and, thus, only one aspect of the aim of medicine. Healing also 
involves the patient’s own perception of what is good, the good that is specific to 
human nature in general, and the spiritual good. The internal morality of medicine 
encompasses all of these dimensions, according to Pellegrino, including what are 
regarded as common bioethical principles, such as beneficence and autonomy. 
However, for Pellegrino, these principles are eternal and grounded in the logic of 
nature, not in common morality or a social construction. 
 
In contrast to Pellegrino, a non-essentialist notion of the internal morality of medicine 
suggests that medical morality is not static, but evolves in correlation with society 
(Brody & Miller, 1998). The aim of medical ethics is thus to integrate the internal 
morality of medicine with the rest of the external morality of society. The internal 
norms are those that are seen as being appropriate to medicine, like relieving 
suffering or the promotion of health. Precisely what these norms are can be the 
subject of debate, but they continue to be specific to the medical profession. The 
existence of internal norms conforms to the tradition of professional practice and the 
ongoing need to regulate doctors’ behaviour. External morality, meanwhile, 
constitutes the norms of the society in which the practice of medicine is embedded. 
Moreover, the development of society and the external norms exert pressure on the 
internal morality of medicine, which develops in congruence with the traditional 
values thereof. 
 
4.1.2. Internal morality in our research 
The findings from our research make a relevant empirical contribution to the 
discussion of medicine’s internal morality. Moreover, our concept seems promising 
as a way of better understanding our observations of doctors’ value-laden decisions in 
patient-encounters. If a basic morality is incorporated in medical knowledge and 
clinical practice, it might explain why doctors do not speak explicitly of moral values. 
Proper moral conduct is thus embedded in the medical profession and learned 
simultaneously while performing clinical medicine. This might also explain certain 
doctors’ resistance to modern bioethics; because it does not take internal morality as a 
basis for clinical decisions into account, it is perceived to be of little relevance. The 
existence of an internal morality that does not stem from each individual doctor, but 
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belongs to the specific field of clinical medicine, might explain the similar moral 
behaviour in the patient encounters of the doctors studied herein. Our results suggest 
that doctors, in their work, act more on behalf of their profession and less as 
independent moral actors. 
 
The idea of values that are internal to medical practice is appealing. It seems almost 
to be a linguistic definition, and the meaning of the very concept of clinical medicine, 
that its purpose is to help patients. In contrast to, for instance, medical science, 
clinical medicine is not about the acquisition of knowledge, but a means of helping 
patients. In view of this, morality can be labelled as being internal to medical practice 
because it is a part of its definition. Furthermore, since medical knowledge is directed 
at bodily functions, both physical and mental, and not at patients’ existential needs or 
spiritual suffering, this too forms what could constitute the aim of medicine. The 
knowledge base of all Western medicine is founded on natural science, in which the 
body is interpreted according to its functions. An internal morality of Western 
medicine must, accordingly, relate to improving bodily functions. 
 
Indeed, we have then distanced ourselves from Pellegrino’s conception of an inner 
morality. While the concept seems to be illuminating, defining inner morality as an 
absolute and unchanging entity actually appears to be an attempt to stem the social 
constructionists, rather than it being a probable and useful account. Moreover, by 
including natural human and spiritual goods, the concept seems to encompass the 
entire domain of ethics, and transpires to be of little use when it comes to explaining 
the phenomena that are specific to clinical medicine. Although the non-essentialist 
view of internal and external norms might be closer to the notion of internal values 
that are consistent with our theory of essentialising, it actually turns out to not be 
particularly useful either. According to this view, external values, such as autonomy, 
can be adopted as internal values if doctors come to understand them as such. Yet this 
makes it difficult to understand how internal norms are legitimised. It would follow 
that any conflict between internal and external values would not survive, because 
they develop in accordance with each other. Yet in these circumstances it would 
hardly be necessary to separate internal and external values. Many philosophers do 
indeed reject the notion of an inner morality of medicine on these grounds (Veatch, 
2001; Beauchamp, 2001). Medicine is just one part of society, and the norms of 
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society must also apply to it. As Veatch points out, the values of medicine are not 
independent of the general values of society, because medical values have their 
content and meaning in relation to a specific society and moral conception. 
Furthermore, the goods of medical practice are so closely related to the goods of our 
entire being that we cannot possibly separate them or define the aims of medicine 
without knowing the purpose of our very existence. 
 
4.1.3. Internal morality and social construction 
Medicine is certainly situated in society and must derive its meaning and aims from 
it. It is, however, appropriate to emphasise the special conditions of the medical 
profession. Our organisation of medical care implies that the professionals are given 
specific resources and specific duties. This means that doctors are permitted to 
behave differently towards patients in that they are allowed to ask intimate questions 
and undertake invasive procedures. The medical profession is thus organised as an 
exemption within society, and, as our studies have suggested, this also affects the 
morality involved. The medical profession is based upon a moral understanding that 
assesses human beings as intrinsically valuable and in which helping people is 
considered to be morally important. The practice of medicine has developed within 
this moral understanding as a means of alleviating human suffering, but still has a 
more specific aim within this structure. Medical science does not engage with all 
kinds of suffering, but with the elements thereof that originate in the human body and 
its functions. The field of medicine can thus be understood as a kind of institution 
within which to engage in the suffering that befalls human beings as bodily entities. 
In line with this, it would be reasonable to assert that the aim of clinical medicine is 
benefiting patients’ health. Health is not to be taken as an absolute good, but as a goal 
within medical operating conditions. Consequently, there may be some other good 
that is more valuable overall. Other values that stem from outside the medical field, 
and from other parts of our culture, might limit these medical values. Indeed, 
respecting patient autonomy may be such an external value, and as a society we may 
want this value to curb the medical aim of improving patient health. Yet, there is a 
conceptual difference between regarding respect for patient autonomy as something 
internal and in congruence with medical aims, or considering it to be a medical 
constraint. Perhaps the latter interpretation is closer to doctors’ own perceptions of 
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their medical duties, and it is tempting to interpret our empirical data along these 
lines. 
 
The philosophical basis for an internal morality of medicine has yet to be established, 
but this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, our empirical findings seem 
to provide some support for the legitimacy of the concept. 
 
4.2. Medical sociology 
An important aspect of our findings was how doctors’ behaviour and decisions did 
not seem to be individually fashioned, but the result of acting as professionals. 
Furthermore, their actions were restricted by professional and practical arrangements. 
Within the field of medical sociology important work has been done in describing 
factors affecting how doctors behave. Such factors are conditions for doctors’ 
medical practice and the institutionalisation of medicine. 
 
4.2.1. The social role of the doctor 
Talcott Parsons’ analysis of the medical profession is a central work (1951). He 
describes how the role of the medical profession is construed in order to overcome 
“obstacles to the effective practice of scientific medicine” (ibid., p.454). Among other 
things, Parsons demonstrates that doctors’ medical competence is based on universal 
scientific knowledge, and he describes how the universalism of the medical role 
serves to protect doctors against personal relationships with their patients. This 
professional distance is, he asserts, necessary, both to protect doctors from the 
emotional pressure of entering into an affective relationship with the patient, but also 
in order to be able to penetrate patients’ personal affairs by remaining as an objective 
outsider. Parsons describes this as “an ‘Archimedean place to stand’ outside the 
reciprocities of ordinary social intercourse” (ibid., p.461). He points out that the 
restriction of doctors’ concern for their patients serves to regulate and justify their 
interventions. Doctors are allowed to behave in certain ways because they have a 
legitimate purpose for their actions in alleviating their patients’ health problems, and 
their exceptions from normal behaviour are restricted to this purpose. Parsons is 
particularly occupied with the social role of the doctor, how this role deviates from 
other roles, and how this affects the relationship with the patient. His discussion 
supports many of our findings, particularly the description of how the conditions of 
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the medical profession guide doctors’ actions and interactions with patients. Doctors 
have a purpose with their interventions which affects what they can legitimately do 
and what they can care about. We can regard this as a sociological explanation of our 
observations of the essentialising process, the functional focus and existential 
filtering. 
 
The field of medical sociology is vast, and I will not attempt to provide any 
systematic introduction to the discipline, but it is of interest to our findings how 
medical sociologists and ethnographers approach the field of medicine in general. 
Most commonly by the use of observational methods, these sociological empirical 
studies aim to uncover structural elements in the behaviour of their participants. This 
has provided important insight into how medical students are socialised into 
becoming professionals (Becker, 1961; Hafferty, 1991) how students learn to manage 
uncertainty (Merton et al., 1957), and how doctors cope with medical errors (Bosk, 
1979). Some sociological findings are strikingly similar to our results, with Renée 
Fox’s concept of “detached concern” being one example (Lief & Fox, 1963). Lief and 
Fox describe the stages of a medical education in which students are actively trained 
to care for their patients in a detached and objectified manner in order to act 
professionally as doctors. The concept is very similar to our findings that doctors act 
courteously, but show very little existential care. Other recent examples are Orfali’s 
ethnographic study that compares decision-making in neonatal intensive care units in 
France and US and Risør’s anthropological analysis of the professional development 
of doctors (Orfali, 2004; Risør, 2010). Orfali found that despite social an legal 
differences in the two countries, doctors articulate ethical dilemmas in medical terms 
in order to maintain control. Risør establishes that “The interns learn to perform 
according to a basic scheme for decision-making [...]. A problem must be expressible 
in a clinical language where pathology and epidemiology are the ideal and which is in 
line with established truths about cause-and effect and logic.” (Ibid., p. 237). 
  
In general, medical sociology reveals, in very concrete ways, how the behaviour of 
doctors is formed within the profession to enable them to perform their professional 
tasks, thus raising our awareness of the collective dimensions of behaviour. In terms 
of ethics, the understanding that our conduct is not only the result of individual 
decisions, but also formed by strong social forces which restrict our options, is vital. 
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4.2.2. Sociology and ethics 
Medical sociologists like Parsons are primarily concerned with the sociological 
aspect of the medical profession, and do not therefore pay attention to how these 
arrangements affect the ethics involved. Parsons describes how the circumstances 
relating to the medical profession make it possible for doctors to perform certain 
tasks. While these arrangements might appear to be a purely practical way of easing 
into clinical work, they do actually change the morality involved in the setting, for 
instance because they impose additional responsibilities on the doctors. In our study, 
focusing specifically on the moral dimension of clinical work ensured that we were 
able to say something about how the process of essentialising altered the doctors’ 
moral assessments of situations. In medical ethics, however, the contribution of 
medical sociology has rarely been taken into account. Indeed, in the branches of 
bioethics that focus particularly on the patient-doctor relationship and patient 
communication, the circumstances are frequently compared to an ordinary meeting 
between individuals in which the need for empathy, personal involvement and mutual 
respect is emphasised (Janssen et al., 2008). Regarding the patient encounter in this 
manner often leads to a portrayal of doctors as reserved or even disinterested, and 
much of the literature on bioethics concludes with the claim that greater empathy and 
involvement on the part of the doctors is required (Larson & Yao, 2005). If we take 
Parsons’ sociological description to heart, however, and pay more attention to the 
social function of the medical profession, we might have to reconsider these ethical 
claims. 
 
Barry Hoffmaster is an ethnographer who has criticised medical ethics for ignoring 
the contributions of medical sociology (Hoffmaster, 2001). Medical ethics has been 
too concerned with normative issues and ethical arguments, he claims, and so has 
failed to see the normative consequences of descriptive studies. In the first edition of 
the influential textbook on medical ethics, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, the 
authors stated that descriptive ethics was only secondary to bioethics (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 1979, p.9). While this statement was omitted in subsequent editions, it 
illustrates the traditionally inferior position of descriptive studies in medical ethics. 
Hoffmaster emphasises that in medical practice, moral and medical decisions are so 
entangled that it does not make sense to separate them in order to study one or the 
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other. How bioethical problems are shaped, and how patients and illnesses are 
defined are philosophical questions that can only be answered within the proper 
context of medical practice. As a consequence, Hoffmaster sees descriptive research, 
such as ethnography and medical sociology studies, as important sources of ethical 
reflection (Hoffmaster, 1992). While it is remarkable that important insights from 
medical sociology have not been taken up in the discourse of medical ethics, the 
recent development of empirical ethics might hopefully be a sign that the contribution 
of descriptive studies on ethics is finally about to be recognised.  
 
4.3. The empirical turn in bioethics 
4.3.1. Medical practicalities 
Bioethics has traditionally been quite theoretically loaded, drawing upon more 
general theories from philosophy and ethics. It is commonly described as a branch of 
applied ethics, which implies the use of general philosophical ethics in the practical 
field of medicine. Applying the general moral rule that you should not lie, would, in 
medicine, mean that doctors must tell the truth to their patients. With the 
development of new technologies and cumulative biomedical knowledge, medicine 
continued to produce new moral questions which had not really been answered or 
tested before. In this way, it provided the field of ethics with ever more dilemmas to 
resolve, as Toulmin pointed out in his much cited article “How medicine saved the 
life of ethics” (1982).  
 
The field of medicine, in becoming ever more complex, has also made bioethical 
discourse more complicated, meaning that moral questions were often firmly 
embedded in the clinical setting. In addition, the juridical aspects of medical 
decisions have been constantly scrutinised, particularly in the United States, and the 
development of law and bioethics has gone hand in hand. This required more 
specialist knowledge in difficult medical areas, such as knowledge of medicine, law 
and bioethics, and has paved the way for a new group of experts: clinical ethicists. 
Clinical ethics is the branch of ethics that is occupied with the moral questions that 
are embedded in actual clinical practice: could we terminate nutrition support to this 
unconscious, vegetative patient? Should the parents be allowed to decide that their 
daughter should not undergo surgical intervention which could prolong her life? The 
term clinical ethics is now mainly used within the context of clinical ethics’ 
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consultations. In other words, it is concerned with the provision of consultation 
services on ethics by the growing profession of ethics’ consultants. Such consultation 
services involve not only moral issues, but also questions of group psychology, 
conflict resolution, power inequality and so forth. 
 
Recently, another branch of bioethics has also emerged, due to the growing number 
of empirical studies undertaken in the field. As we described in the introduction, 
these studies cover matters like interviews with health care personnel, observations of 
medical departments, and questionnaires relating to the moral grounds for medical 
decisions. Recently, these endeavours have been gathered under the new term, 
empirical ethics, and there has been much discussion about what this entails and what 
purpose it actually serves (Molewijk et al, 2004; Musschenga, 2005). Many of the 
empirical studies in question are descriptive, recounting matters like the arguments of 
doctors or nurses or describing a particular medical practice. Traditionally, moral 
philosophy has had a rather constrained attitude towards descriptive research, 
referring to the fundamental gap between is and ought, which originates from David 
Hume (Hume, 1978). The thesis says that describing how the world is cannot tell us 
how we ought to behave. Even if 90% of all of the doctors in a study consider it to be 
morally right to not reveal the full truth about their prognosis to dying patients, in 
order to protect them from severe depression, they may still all be wrong. Our 
accepted moral practices, like slavery once was, can always turn out to be morally 
wrong. There is no logical way to infer what ought to be done from what is actually 
the case. The “ought” and “is” statements belong to two fundamentally different 
classes: normative and descriptive statements. 
 
4.3.2. Empirical ethics 
Why do we need empirical research into ethics then? We ought to distinguish here 
between (at least) two different types of research on ethics. A common way of 
empirically exploring the field of medical ethics is to study the moral attitudes of 
health care personnel. Even if you cannot infer what is morally right from what the 
participants in a study believe, their comments can inform medical ethics about the 
kinds of arguments that are prevailing and how health care personnel assess the moral 
values involved in different settings. This knowledge could enable the field of 
medical ethics to target its moral arguments in such a way that they have an impact 
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on how medical decisions are made. Exploring these attitudes is also often used to 
reveal cases of malpractice and to target areas in which the moral standards of health 
care personnel need to be improved. 
 
Another way to conduct empirical ethics is to describe actual medical practice. This 
approach can inform medical ethics about the organisation and practice of health care 
by illustrating how and what kinds of situations arise. This is perhaps the most 
important contribution made by the discipline. If ought-statements from moral 
philosophy should have any implications for actual medical practice, then they must 
relate to what medical practice is really like. A crucial role of empirical ethics is to 
display the particularities of medical practice in order to understand what the practice 
implies in ethical terms. If most doctors believe that it is morally right to deceive a 
dying patient, the interesting question is why they think that this is morally 
defensible. We might discover that the answer is not moral negligence or a lack of 
moral sensitivity that needs to be corrected; there may be other, overriding moral 
considerations that we have not yet discerned. Indeed, the peculiarities of the 
situation may have moral implications that are not as easily detectable by outsiders, 
but are nevertheless sensed by the participants. When people behave immorally, 
seemingly for no good reason, or seem to be immune to moral correction, it might be 
appropriate to ask if there are aspects of the situation that we have not properly 
understood. This seems to be relevant to medicine, given doctors’ fairly modest 
interest in bioethics. 
 
In particular, empirical ethics has the potential to contribute to a fuller understanding 
of the premises of health care and the medical profession. All too often, bioethical 
discussions seem to be so stuck on the theoretical arguments that they remain blind to 
obvious practical circumstances that limit their relevance. This is not chiefly a 
problem of how to apply moral demands in medical practice; it is instead a question 
of how the practical arrangements of the medical profession form the ethical 
decisions that are involved therein. Many practical conditions limit the freedom of 
action of the participants. Some are obvious in health care, like resources and time, 
while others are perhaps more hidden, but they all curb the possibilities of moral 
choice. It might not be philosophically legitimate to infer what ought to be done from 
what is the case, but what ought to be done nevertheless rests upon what it is possible 
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to do. This normative aspect of empirical ethics has been addressed by several 
ethicists, exploring how empirical ethics bridges the gap between facts and values (de 
Wries & Gordijn, 2009; Kon, 2009). 
 
4.4. The patients’ lot 
We did not specifically investigate the patients’ perspective, and I have gone through 
the reasons why, as well as some of the drawbacks, in earlier sections. In this section 
I will discuss some of the aspects of the patient’s position that we could, nonetheless, 
identify in our findings. 
 
4.4.1. Medical depersonalisation 
In our first study, we found that the doctors took special care to filter their patients’ 
existential issues in order to address medical matters more specifically, and this was 
further supported and elaborated on in our third study. At the same time, the patients’ 
complaints were made to be as concrete and measurable as possible. This way of 
addressing patients as objects requires some form of medical depersonalisation, 
which is an ability to look beyond the specific personhood of the individual. In many 
cases, being objectified is probably not an issue. When the patient sees the doctor 
with a well-defined concern, such as a broken finger or an ear infection, it is of little 
consequence that the medic treats your finger or ear as an object, and neither patient 
nor doctor would want it any other way. Yet maybe more often than we are normally 
aware of, this depersonalisation does affect patients. 
 
As we have only observed patients’ reactions and not interviewed them about their 
experiences, I have borrowed an illustrative example from the authors Gulbrandsen 
and Schei (2000): 
 
The patient, Mona, is 35, a waitress and mother of a 5-year-old girl. After a difficult 
childbirth she developed a weakness in the rectal musculature. When the general 
practitioner asks about her consultation at the specialist, she starts to cry. 
“The doctor examined me down there, and asked me how I was doing. But when I 
tried to answer him, when I started to tell how horrible it is to carry heavy trays at 
work, that I hardly can walk on trails where others are present, and that my sexual 
life is ruined, then he turned away and started to read my journal!” 
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Compared with our own empirical data, the example appears to be credible. We 
observed many similar situations in which the doctors turned away or changed the 
subject when the patients tried to express something which was personally important. 
Many patients seemed to react in a negative way to personal issues being ignored, 
and although we could not confirm these interpretations, watching the situations 
unfold, and by putting ourselves in the position of the patients, we could recognise 
the feeling of being rejected. To be reduced to a medical object can be an unpleasant 
and morally offensive experience, which threatens to aggravate a patient’s distress 
instead of alleviating it. This has led to a demand for a more humane form of 
medicine, where doctors are not only body technicians, but also attend to the entirety 
of human nature. 
 
But what does it mean to care for patients as complete human beings? It seems to 
imply that doctors should address patients’ personal values as well as their medical 
issues, and should also be cognizant of their existential dimensions when treating 
them. Doctors could ask: “What does this suffering mean to you?” or “How does 
your illness affect you in your life?” Yet, what right do doctors have to ask questions 
that go beyond medical issues, and what would be the purpose? As doctors, the 
professionals have the opportunity to ask patients about private and intimate details, 
their sex life, abuse, or psychiatric symptoms, but only providing that they have 
medical reasons for doing so, and on the basis that medical remedies might exist. 
Doctors possess no special knowledge of life’s existential dimension; they do not 
know better than anyone else what gives meaning to life. Moreover, by probing into 
patients’ private matters, doctors distance themselves from their professional role and 
risk invading the privacy of their patients’ lives. If the medical sphere does not limit 
doctors’ concerns, just how far should these commitments extend? Should doctors 
not only concern themselves with the possible depression of their lonely patients, but 
also their loneliness? Should they attempt to find some friends for their patients? 
Should doctors make friends with their lonely patients? Somehow it seems that it 
would be impossible and even harmful to compel doctors to engage with their 
patients as people. The professional distance, as described by medical sociologists, is 
important, not only to avoid that doctors are exhausted with personal requests from 
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patients, but also to protect patients from having their lives invaded by well-
intentioned doctors. 
 
4.4.2. Unavoidable clinical harm 
Our findings suggest that reducing patients to medical objects is unavoidable in the 
work of a doctor. In order to use their medical expertise, both theoretical and 
practical, they have to be able to approach patients as objects. How else could 
doctors, put bluntly, cut open the stomach of a pregnant woman during a Caesarean 
section? This ability to deal with patients as medical objects is meticulously learned 
during medical school and practice, and is also described in several renowned studies 
in medical sociology (Parsons, 1951; Becker, 1961). This reductionism is a central 
premise of modern medicine; a premise that most patients readily accept. A patient 
with an ear infection expects the doctor to focus his attention on his ear, not on the 
rest of him. Yet, the patient might feel uncomfortable if the doctor did not greet him, 
if he just stared at the computer when he spoke, or if he did not take the time to 
explain the treatment he was recommending. Even if the patient accepts the doctor’s 
medical approach to his ear, it is crucial that the rest of him is treated as a person. In 
many ways, this corresponds to the distinction we discovered in the third study 
between existential care and courteousness. While doctors have to overlook 
existential matters when dealing with medical issues, they can still express human 
courtesy. As we have emphasised in the third study, this may actually disguise the 
ongoing objectivation of patients. It could also cause confusion if doctors believe that 
they are caring for patients as people while patients feel that they are existentially 
neglected. Yet, we do not mean to devalue doctors’ courteousness. At its best 
courteous behaviour might alleviate patients’ experiences of being objectified, even if 
it cannot prevent medical reduction of the patient. However, in order to achieve this, 
the real significance of this form of human interaction must be appreciated.  
 
Respectful human interaction is always a positive thing to encounter. In normal social 
contact in the workplace, and during commercial interactions, we appreciate being 
treated in a friendly and respectful manner. When you take your car to the garage, 
you expect the mechanic to say hello, listen to your explanations and repair the car. 
However, if he fails to greet you, you are unlikely to be seriously, morally offended 
by this. Presenting yourself to the doctor is not, however, quite the same as taking 
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your car for inspection. In a medical consultation, the patient offers himself up for 
scrutiny, without the option to deliver his body to the doctor, leave and collect it later 
when it has been repaired. The patient not only has a body, he also is the body, 
referring to a phenomenological insight by Merleau-Ponty (2002). When the doctor 
goes to work and approaches the patient’s body as an object, the patient is also 
treated as an object. This is why doctors’ expressions of mutual respect have even 
greater significance in the doctor – patient relationship. Acts of recognising the 
human value of patients are a way of restoring this relationship, despite the fact that 
doctors systematically damage it.  
 
4.4.3. Moral residue 
Realising how doctors’ displays of respect can be vital to restoring a patient as a 
human being, and being aware that doctors’ courteousness can play a more important 
role than ordinary, friendly social interaction, leads us to a moral concept that has 
traditionally been paid relatively little attention. In Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
Beauchamp and Childress introduce the notion of moral residue, a concept that adds 
complexity to the principle-based theory, but is not elaborated on in the book (2009, 
p. 16). If you have to decide between two conflicting principles, the one that is 
overridden does not just disappear. Instead, you have to try to repair the moral 
damage caused by overriding this principle, thus minimising the negative effects 
thereof. If, for instance, you have made a promise to a family member and a friend 
that happens to clash in time, you will have to break one of the promises. You will, 
however, have an obligation to minimise the effects of the broken promise. You may 
try to reschedule in advance, provide compensation in some other way or at least 
excuse and explain your behaviour to the person you let down. Failure to deal with 
the consequences of your broken promise will add to your moral devaluation. 
 
Some authors have used the concept of moral residue as an indication of the existence 
of real moral dilemmas. This is because even if we choose what we consider to be 
morally right in a difficult situation, we may still feel remorse and guilt as indicators 
that we also did something morally wrong (McConnell, 1996). Without taking a stand 
on the existence of moral dilemmas, the concept of moral residue still identifies a 
significant aspect of morality that is often omitted from bioethical discussions. When 
two moral principles or values conflict, and you have to override one of them in order 
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to fulfil the other, more important principle, it is still not right to override the value in 
question. It is simply more wrong to override the other. Doing the right thing still 
involves the commission of a wrongdoing, creating a moral residue in the form of a 
continuing moral duty to compensate the wrongdoing. This takes us away from 
thinking of morality in terms of punctuate choices. The moral content of a choice 
goes beyond the mere decision that is made. The morality of a distinct choice adheres 
to what you have done in the lead up to making the decision (was it preventable?), 
how you carry out the decision you have made and how you respond to the moral 
residue and new moral duties that are the result of the initial choice. We can relate 
this insight to the findings of our second study: describing morality in terms of the 
presence of a choice does not do justice to what morality is all about.  
 
4.4.4. Moral residues in clinical practice 
The notion of moral residue is particularly interesting in light of our analysis of the 
existential filtering of clinical practice, and might point to possible resolutions to the 
conflicting duties of the doctor. Doctors have a moral duty to respect their patients as 
individuals, in the same way we all have a duty to respect the people we interact with. 
In addition, doctors have a professional moral duty to help patients medically. To 
assist them in doing this, we have suggested that they are required to treat their 
patients partly as an object, and must also leave the patients’ existential issues out of 
their medical reasoning. This disregard of the patient as a person is a moral offence, 
which the patient can experience as being more or less offensive depending on the 
circumstances. It may, however, be unavoidable when it comes to acting 
professionally. Many doctors might excuse inauspicious encounters by the use of this 
rationale. When patients complain that the doctor did not take the time to speak 
properly to them, or only focused on an injured body part and took no notice of them 
personally, their doctors would probably respond with an explanation of why this was 
necessary to fix the affected elbow or shoulder. For doctors, the handling of patients 
partly involves opposing duties. Nevertheless, when it comes to the concept of moral 
residue, even if doctors’ professional duties require them to sometimes disregard the 
patient as a person, it does not simply eliminate the principle of respecting the patient 
as an individual. When doctors disregard the personal aspects of patients in order to 
treat them, it leaves a moral residue that requires them to minimise the effects of this 
depersonalisation. This could be achieved by shortening the period of objectification, 
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objectifying patients as little as possible, affirming the human contact with the patient 
when possible and perhaps apologising for neglecting personal issues. 
 
In our study of videotaped patient encounters, we looked for any signs of the doctors 
trying to repair the moral offence of depersonalisation. We observed some attempts to 
do so, for instance, by apologising when turning to the computer screen during a 
conversation. However, these observations were few and far between. In general, it 
looked as if the doctors were unaware of the offending nature of the 
depersonalisation. Possibly because they were so used to it and regarded it as a 
necessary element of their clinical work, they shifted readily between social talk and, 
for instance, objectifying examinations, seemingly without even noticing when they 
were treating the patient as a person and when they were treating him as an object. 
Patients do indeed anticipate some of these transitions and expect the doctor to focus 
on the injured body part. Accordingly, the degree to which the depersonalisation is 
experienced as a moral offence probably varies. However, it is possible that many of 
the negative experiences that patients report from their medical consultations are 
linked to this depersonalisation. 
 
The concept of moral residue points towards a possible way of dealing with the 
negative effects of an objectifying medical approach. Doctors should be aware that 
their methods perhaps inevitably inflict some harm on patients, even if the moral 
intention is to help them. Doctors should, however, learn to take responsibility for 
these infringements, rather than dismissing them as inevitable incidents or, worse 
still, denying that any moral offence occurs as part of the medical process. 
 
4.5. Relation to other empirical work 
4.5.1. Empathy and moral development 
Much attention has been paid to the development of students’ attitudes during their 
time at medical school. Several studies have shown that students’ moral perceptions, 
empathy and communication skills decline during these years of training, which is a 
quite alarming fact (Coulehan & Williams, 2001; Patenaude et al., 2003). This 
negative development is commonly explained by the lack of formal training on these 
issues and the significant influence of the informal curriculum (Wear & Zarconi, 
2008). The term informal curriculum describes the tacit elements of medical practice 
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that students and young doctors learn from their more experienced colleagues. It is 
considered to be important elements of learning how medicine is actually practiced 
and what it means to behave as a professional, but is not a formal part of the medical 
education. This tacit curriculum is part of the socialisation in the norms of the 
profession. Doctors learn clinical work by observing their superiors, who act as role 
models for newcomers, and it is this way of learning that is believed to have greater 
impact on students. For instance, students are educated in patient autonomy and the 
importance of informed consent in the classroom, but if they afterwards join a 
surgical department where informed consent is treated by senior surgeons as a mere 
formality, students learn to pay no heed to this aspect of the formal curriculum. 
Interpreting medical education in this way normally leads to questions about how to 
change the informal curricula, how to produce better role models and how to 
accentuate the formal curriculum on ethics and communication (White et al., 2009).  
 
There is, however, another way to look at the alleged decline in medical students’ 
empathy that will produce different questions and perhaps suggest other solutions. I 
believe that the concept of essentialising is useful when it comes to understanding 
this phenomenon. Medical school teaches students basic anatomy, physiology and 
pathology and how different diseases affect the human body. Students are taught 
techniques to approach and examine the human body and mind as entities that may 
malfunction. This modus operandi takes years for students to learn because they have 
to find out how to approach people as physical objects and how to transgress the 
ordinary rules of human behaviour and bodily contact. We could see the results of 
this process in our first study, where the doctors focused on objective measurements 
and bodily functions, while disregarding the more personal dimensions of an 
individual. However, the process of essentialising, which is so meticulously 
inculcated, is never the object of scrutiny in medical education. Hence, the contents 
and consequences of essentialising are not made explicit or discussed. When students 
then enter medical practice, they start acting in the ways that they have learned – not 
only via the informal curriculum, but no less so via the formal curriculum. Formal 
medical education also prepares students for the process of essentialising. 
 
I suspect that there is no major gap between the formal and informal curriculum when 
it comes to the application of medical knowledge, diagnoses and treatment. However, 
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what students (and outsiders) might be surprised by when they enter the clinical field 
is what this application means in practice when it comes to dealing with patients. 
Attending to the functions of the abdominal organs of a patient means ignoring his 
personal explanations of abdominal pain (unless they provide a clue to the diagnosis), 
demanding his partial nakedness, palpating his stomach like just another object, and 
paying little attention to his possible discomfort. The concreteness of these actions 
lets the inexperienced doctor discover how the formal curriculum is put into practice 
and what clinical work is all about. 
 
According to this interpretation, the problem with the formal education in ethics and 
communication is not that it is counteracted by the more powerful informal curricula. 
Instead, the problem is that it is separated from, and partially opposes, the rest of the 
medical education available, both formal and informal. In medical ethics’ classes, 
students are taught to respect patients as autonomous beings, but the courses rarely 
explain how they are supposed to do this while, at the same time, retrieve the medical 
information they need from the patient and his body. It is thus not surprising that a 
recent doctoral thesis reveals that conceptualisations of empathy in medicine tend to 
accommodate to objectivistic ideals instead of challenging them (Pedersen, 2010, p. 
171). 
 
4.5.2. The patient-doctor relationship 
Much weight has been attached to the issue of patient autonomy during the modern 
development of medical ethics. In line with the rise of human rights in the rest of 
society and the weakening of the medical authorities, the focus on the patient’s 
position in the health care system has been emphasised. Medical paternalism has 
become reviled and a symbol of doctors’ unjustified control over their patients 
(Holm, 1993; Coulter, 1999). Emanuel and Emanuel’s much cited article describes 
the role of the doctor in terms of four different dimensions: paternalistic, informative, 
interpretive and deliberative (1992). While they admit that these dimensions might 
vary according to circumstances, their explicit ideal of the doctor is one of 
deliberation, wherein these professionals use their medical knowledge and, based on 
a patient’s personal life and aspirations, offer advice about the best possible solutions: 
“...the physician acts as a teacher or friend, engaging the patient in dialogue on what 
course of action would be best, the physician indicates what the patient should do, 
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what decision regarding medical therapy would be admirable.” (Ibid.) Similar models 
have been put forward by many authors of work on medical ethics, and have given 
rise to movements like Shared Decision-Making and Patient Centred Medicine 
(Sandman & Munthe, 2010; Epstein & Peters, 2009). The purpose of these 
movements is to neutralise the power inequality between doctors and patients, putting 
the latter more in charge of their health and illness. According to this view, doctors 
should serve patients with their expert knowledge, while patients should contribute 
with their personal preferences and life goals. Then, together, the doctor and the 
patient should try to reach a common decision about what examinations or treatments 
are optimal for this unique individual. 
 
Several empirical studies have, however, shown that doctors do not adhere to these 
principles of shared decision-making. Instead, they inadequately discuss treatment 
and options, meaning that patients are unable to evaluate their full range of choices 
(Karnieli-Miller & Eisikovits, 2009). Doctors also fail to elicit patients’ personal 
perspectives and preferences (Corke et al., 2005). Furthermore, the decision-making 
process is often described as being dominated by doctors, with little real involvement 
from the patients (Braddock et al., 1999). Referring to the decision-making ideals, 
these studies commonly result in a concern for the doctors’ negligence. Our findings 
are consistent with the above-mentioned research, yet we conclude differently. These 
prescriptive ideals often do not take into account the specific conditions of clinical 
medicine. If doctors are, indeed, bound by a common demand of benefiting their 
patients’ health, this profoundly restricts their possibility to engage in other, more 
personal aims of their patients. 
 
Closely related to issues of Patient Centred Medicine is the field of patient 
communication. Although observations of patient encounters constitute a major part 
of our empirical data, we are interested these interactions as one of several observable 
parts of doctors’ work. We do not concentrate particularly on communication, and 
only a brief reference to this vast field is due here. The literature on patient-doctor 
communication focuses on how to enhance patient communication for various 
purposes, one of which is improving the quality of medical care. In many of the 
consultations we observed, we could sense that the doctor’s communication with the 
patient was counterproductive to the aim of improving the latter’s health, an example 
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being not paying attention to a patient who was trying to explain his real problem. 
Our observations suggest that improving how doctors’ abilities to communicate could 
benefit the medical care they provide when it comes to understanding what a patient’s 
problem is, how to facilitate good examination conditions, and how to maximise 
patient compliance. Indeed, the numerous videotaped patient encounters we utilised 
in the third study were collected in order to evaluate the effects of a course on clinical 
communication. Yet the reason for improving patient communication is often 
explained with reference to its impact on patient health; it is a conditional good that 
gains its value from what it produces in favourable outcomes (Baile et al., 2000; 
Matthews et al., 1993). From this point of view, improving patient communication 
remains within the medical paradigm, and does not really relate to the existential 
issues that our theory describes. 
 
A different and also much-stated reason for improving patient communication is the 
desire to develop doctors’ empathic abilities and strengthen the human relationship 
between doctor and patient (Epstein & Peters, 2009). Indeed, this motive often 
coincides with that of improving patient health. Eliciting the patient’s perspective is 
both a means to important medical information and an opportunity to develop the 
human relationship between patient and doctor. From a moral point of view, 
however, these two arguments differ in terms of what they regard as the purpose of 
the communication. Strengthening the patients’ perspectives and improving the 
communication in order to reach a mutual understanding of the patient’s suffering 
would underscore the clinical encounter as a reciprocal meeting between two human 
beings. This view on communication does indeed have existential undertones, but 
also draws upon certain humanistic ideals that I find problematic, as I will attempt to 
explain in the next section. 
 
4.5.3. Humanistic ideals 
Many empirical studies are consistent with our findings; both renowned work in the 
field of medical sociology, as well as more recent empirical research in medical 
ethics and communication. As discussed in the previous section, much of this work 
describes challenges in the patient-doctor relationship, such as doctors distancing 
themselves from patients, doctors’ lack of empathic responses, failures to elicit 
patients’ perspectives and poor communication. While the empirical findings 
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coincide with ours and thus support our theory of the essentialising process, most 
researchers draw different conclusions. The challenges in the patient-doctor 
relationship often lead the researcher to conclude that doctors must resolve these 
shortcomings (Fine et al., 2010; Pollak et al., 2007). Although a few have questioned 
the premises of the patient encounter (Greenhalgh et al., 2006; Schaufel et al, 2009), 
the general presumption is that these failings are deficiencies of doctors, and it is 
likely that many of these researchers are influenced by the prominent demands of a 
humanistic movement in bioethics and medicine. 
 
This humanistic movement is not well-defined. It is a collection of trends that are 
concerned with the maintenance of humaneness within medical practice and with 
doctors’ development of humanity in the medical profession (Boudreau et al., 2007). 
The movement might be regarded as a reaction to the technological development and 
specialisation of modern medicine (Cassell, 1991). It focuses on the suffering of the 
patient, not just the illness or the functional impairment. It also emphasises the need 
to address patients as complete human beings, which includes their existential and 
spiritual dimensions (Barry et al., 2001; Hudak et al., 2007). The post-Cartesian 
division between mind and body is often treated with scorn. The field of medical 
humanities constitutes part of the humanistic movement, and advocates the 
stimulation of imaginative insight into the lives and experiences of others, through 
literature and other art forms, in order to cultivate humane doctors who are more 
attentive to their patients’ suffering (Skelton et al., 2000; Hunter et al., 1995). A 
considerable part of the humanistic movement is concerned with the development of 
empathy, and often recommends including more “soft” subjects in the medical 
curriculum, like communication and ethics as well as the non-scientific literature and 
art. The human relationship between patients and doctors is emphasised, accentuating 
the latter’s obligation to put themselves in the position of the former and respond 
with compassion and empathy (Halpern, 2007; Charon, 2001). 
 
I believe that the descriptions of medical practice that are highlighted by the 
humanistic movement are important in a particular way. They reveal and emphasise 
the patient’s perspective, including the vulnerability and powerlessness that many 
feel when facing their doctor and the health care system. What I find problematical is 
the lack of attention that is paid to the specific prerequisites of the medical 
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profession; the insights from medical sociology about the premises of medical work 
seem to be brushed aside. An understanding of how the patient-doctor relationship 
differs from ordinary human relationships and how this difference has a specific 
objective in medical work is largely neglected. It is easy to state that doctors should 
be more empathetic and personally involved in their patients’ lives, but it is pointless 
to make this demand without relating it to the distance that is required in order to act 
professionally. Likewise, it is questionable whether doctors should really have to ask 
about or try to elicit patients’ existential suffering if they do not have the means to be 
of any assistance in these matters. The doctors’ privilege to ask their patients 
questions otherwise unheard of is related to their professional medical remedies, for 
which no equivalent exist when it comes to existential issues. 
 
A paradox is that the humanistic movement may in fact prevent some of the changes 
in medicine that it seeks to bring about. This is because it tends to suggest answers 
that are too simple and unbalanced when it comes to complex issues. While it does 
shed light on some of the major challenges within medicine and medical practice, 
some of its straightforward solutions might actually shroud the deeper issues that are 
connected to health care as a social practice. Moreover, some of the movement’s 
more imbalanced resolutions seem to repel doctors instead of drawing their attention 
to underlying, problematic issues. This thesis stands in the humanistic tradition in the 
sense that we recognise how doctors overlook existential issues and acknowledge that 
this might have a detrimental effect on patients. However, our work also opposes the 
humanistic tradition in that we are searching for explanations, and hence resolutions, 
elsewhere. In keeping to our empirical objective, we are not trying to look for 
answers in the traditional discourse of medical ethics, but are instead aiming to 
understand the internal logic of the participants in medical practice in order to 
understand why these problematic situations arise. 
 
5. Study limitations 
The measures for evaluating qualitative research are generally not as straightforward 
as for quantitative studies, and the criteria and terms used may vary between authors. 
Important aspects to evaluate in qualitative work often include an assessment of 
internal and external validity, relevance and reflexivity (Malterud, 2001; Giacomini 
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& Cook, 2000), while Glaserian Grounded Theory uses its own evaluation criteria. I 
will address each of these matters separately, although some of them do overlap. 
 
5.1. Evaluating Grounded Theory 
Glaserian Grounded Theory is aimed at generating plausible theories, and the focus is 
on the process of generation. It is not a proper method for testing hypotheses and this 
has consequences for how results should be evaluated. The product of Grounded 
Theory is a theoretical conception of the research field, which contains theoretical 
categories and explanation models that are not natural entities, but constructions with 
which to explain the phenomena in question. Accordingly, the quality of the 
hypotheses is assessed in terms of their explanatory power. In Grounded Theory, the 
theoretical end product gains its credibility from judging its fit, relevance, workability 
and modifiability (Glaser, 1998; 1978). 
 
5.1.1. Fit and relevance 
A theory’s fit corresponds roughly to what is otherwise known as internal validity, 
which characterises the relationship between theoretical concepts and data. A theory 
that fits succeeds in representing the patterns of data it intends to signify. This implies 
that researchers have approached the field with an open mind and allowed the theory 
to emerge without forcing predetermined theoretical constructions upon the data. 
Closely connected to the issue of fit is the relevance of a study. A theory is relevant if 
it relates to the main concerns of the participants in the field. Accordingly, the 
relevance of the theory reflects whether the empirical data is taken seriously and the 
hypothesis really deals with what is happening in the field of study. In our research, 
we have strived to be open to the patterns that emerged through observations and 
interviews. The fact that we ended up with an analysis that we did not expect and that 
gave us new insight into the field supports our belief that the theory is based on the 
empirical data and not on preconceived concepts. The theory of essentialising can be 
judged to be relevant because it is constantly repeated in the data. Essentialising is 
something that all doctors do in their encounters with patients or their medical 
history. Likewise, we found that displaying medical concern and courteousness while 
neglecting existential care was a common way of handling patients. The responses to 
our theories from doctors and other medical personnel have shown that they 
immediately recognised the patterns of behaviour that we describe, and this is a 
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further sign of the theory’s fit and relevance. One could question this relevance due to 
the objections of several doctors to the notion of existential filtering, which might be 
an indication that the concept did not, in fact, fit. However, we took this criticism 
seriously and explored it directly in our third study, treating it as a negative case 
which needed to be reworked and integrated into the theory. 
 
5.1.2. Workability 
The workability of a theory reflects how easily it is translated into practice. Its 
construction also has to be clear, so that it is possible to understand both how the 
researchers have arrived at their theory and how it is to be used on new data. A 
workable theory can account for most of the variations in data, and so should be able 
to explain what has happened as well as anticipate what will happen in a similar field. 
I have tried to portray as much of the research process as possible in this thesis in 
order to demonstrate how the theory was constructed. Whether or not I have 
succeeded is for others to judge. I believe that the theory of essentialising is highly 
workable, as it is able to explain a great deal of what happens in the data. We can 
understand much of the rationale behind doctors’ actions in light of the process of 
essentialising, and we can also largely predict what they will ask and how they will 
behave in a variety of situations. Moreover, the theory accounts for many of the 
phenomena that patients experience in consultations, like being interrupted, not being 
properly listened to and experiencing the doctors’ focus being on objective medical 
signs (Levinson et al., 2000; Corke et al., 2005). Furthermore, the division between 
courteousness and existential care explains why doctors feel that they have been kind 
and respectful, even though they have actually dismissed patients’ worries. 
 
5.1.3. Modifiability 
A Grounded Theory is never complete, and it should be possible to modify it when 
confronted with new and relevant data. Indeed, use of the constant-comparative 
method means that the theory should always adapt to what is happening in the field. 
Even if, for practical reasons, researchers have to utilise a cut-off point in order to 
commit a theory to writing, it must nevertheless be possible to adjust it in the light of 
new data that affects it. Because the theory is a theoretical construct based on 
behaviour in a field of society, it must be possible to modify it in correlation with the 
development of that society. We have modified our theory several times since we 
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first formulated the concept of essentialising. Indeed, feedback we received about our 
initial findings revealed new scenarios and arguments that we incorporated into the 
study. We also developed parts of the theory further by performing the third study 
and including a different set of data. Our theory is, of course, still open to refinements 
or changes in light of new and confronting material.  
 
5.2. Internal validity 
Internal validity refers to whether a study has actually explored what the researcher 
intended to examine. We set out to investigate the implicit values of medical practice 
using observations and interviews. How it is possible to express tacit dimensions and 
access moral behaviour are obvious issues which affect the internal validity of the 
research, which were addressed both in the section about of tacit knowledge and in 
the interview section of the first study. The selection of the doctors and patients who 
were included in the study may have had a profound impact on its internal validity. 
We used theoretical sampling as our methodological strategy, and this is explained in 
more detail in relation to the first study. The criteria for selecting the video 
encounters that we utilised and the effects thereof have also been discussed earlier in 
relation to the third study. In a Grounded Theory approach, the emphasis on the 
workability of a theory, as discussed above, is also related to its internal validity and 
the credibility of the findings that are made. 
 
5.2.1. Transparency 
It is not possible to directly expose the kind of tacit and moral behaviour we wanted 
to examine in this research, and this makes us vulnerable to allegations of subjectivity 
and speculative analysis. Yet these are not problems that are specific to our work. 
Sociological and ethnographic research often depends heavily on trust in the 
researchers’ personal ability to collect and analyse data, as well as their willingness to 
expose their methods to scrutiny. After all, it is often not possible to access this kind 
of data in any other more impartial or objective manner. Throughout this dissertation 
I have tried to highlight my approach to sampling, collecting and analysing the 
material in order to expose my line of reasoning to outsiders. It is indeed possible to 
question every step we have taken in this research, and I do not claim to have 
discussed all of the decisions that were made, since any attempt to do so would 
always underestimate the abundance of choices that were open to me. Yet, revealing 
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my reflections and methodological decisions is an attempt to make my research as 
transparent to readers as possible, so that they can follow the research process, 
evaluate the decisions we made independently and judge how these choices affected 
our results. Indeed, detailing our methods and analysis is actually an important step in 
ensuring that our research is comprehensive and also strengthens its internal validity. 
A discussion of my own preconceptions in the section on reflexivity is a further 
disclosure of these methodological choices. 
 
5.2.2. Triangulation 
Triangulation involves combining different types of data collection, methodologies, 
theories as well as different researchers to study the same phenomenon. The 
triangulation of methods was a key decision when it came to validating our results in 
response to the challenges of exposing tacit knowledge (Patton, 1999). In the first 
study, we decided to combine observations and interviews in order to address the 
doctors’ actual work as well as their motivations and expressed reasons for their 
behaviour. As discussed earlier (in the interview section of the first study), the 
decision to combine observations and interviews in the first study was made to meet 
some of the shortcomings of each of these methods. The findings were explored in 
detail theoretically, which was one of the factors that led to the second manuscript, 
and this theoretical probing can be seen as a further expansion of the method by the 
exploration of different angles of the same field. In the third study, by watching 
videotaped encounters, we supplemented the theory with a whole new set of data and 
a different observation technique. Moreover, several researchers observed and 
analysed the same videotaped cases, supplying the emerging theory with different 
viewpoints and specialist knowledge from a variety of fields. In summary, we have 
tried to access the field with a range of different approaches in order to overcome 
some of the challenges that are related to our aim of exposing what is tacit and 
invisible. What we did, however, omit was the step of speaking to patients, which 
might have leant additional rigour to our results. This issue is dealt with more 
extensively below. 
 
5.2.3. Negative cases 
Searching for negative cases was also an attempt to enhance the internal validity of 
the research. Firstly, when deciding on the settings in which to observe medical 
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practice, we did not single out situations in which we expected there to be many 
moral issues raised. Instead, we included patients and doctors from very different 
specialities, and we particularly sought to include settings like general practice, which 
would be likely to cover some trivial medical issues, together with other settings 
wherein we expected a moral discourse to be absent, such as in a surgical department. 
Grounded Theory has a distinct way of dealing with deviant cases in the process of 
analysis, since the method is attuned to the possible modification of the theory in 
light of relevant new data. Indeed, the presence of many unusual cases signifies that 
there are important aspects of the research field that the researcher has not accounted 
for, meaning that it is necessary to continue with data collection and analysis until 
these atypical cases have been integrated into the theory. What might at first appear 
to be a deviant case, such as when a doctor expressed genuine concern about how an 
elderly patient was passed between departments, became after more extensive 
analysis an important part of the theory. This is because it enabled us to realise that 
the doctor objected to this patient’s treatment, not because it was unworthy, but 
because it had a negative impact on her health. His concern was indeed moral, but of 
a medical nature, aiming to benefit the patient’s health. 
 
Furthermore, when exposed to our concept of existential filtering, and with the aim of 
debunking our theory, several doctors supplied us with case histories which 
demonstrated that they really cared for their patients as individuals and fellow human 
beings after all. If we are to take Grounded Theory’s mantra that “all is data” 
seriously, other people’s objections to our findings could be seen as an indication of 
the presence of atypical cases. Trying to understand the reasons for the doctors’ 
objections, and integrating their stories into our analysis of the data, led us to 
discover in the third study the distinction between human and existential concern. 
Nevertheless, the danger remains that the researcher tries to overlook or explain away 
deviant cases instead of taking them as an indication of flaws or omissions in the 
theory. Indeed, in the third study, we did observe some patient encounters in which 
the doctors did not seem to cut the patients off when they expressed existential 
concerns, while some even encouraged such narrative. What these consultations had 
in common, however, was that the medical problem had already been resolved or set 
aside. This meant that these doctors did not have any overarching medical concern 
guiding the encounter, and so we could still understand what was happening on the 
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basis of the theory of essentialising. Yet, it is important to note that others might have 
interpreted these examples as atypical cases. 
 
5.2.4. The patient’s perspective 
When we first initiated this research, we wanted to focus on doctors’ tacit handling of 
moral issues. This led us to observe how doctors work and behave in a normal 
clinical setting, with or without patients. Our main interest was in the doctors. 
However, the communication between doctor and patient was of course central to 
understanding the former’s work and to realise the consequences of it. When the 
results of our first study made us aware of the process of essentialising, and 
existential filtering in particular, it became clear that the doctors’ tacit moral 
behaviour had considerable consequences for their patients. This was further 
established in the third study, wherein we became aware of the difference between 
the doctors’ human and existential concern. What is, however, missing from our 
research is the perspective of patients. When we observed medical encounters for this 
work, we sensed that in many cases the patients were reacting negatively to being 
overlooked, interrupted and objectified, and it was easy to understand these reactions 
from the situations. Yet we did not ask the patients how they felt. What is more, we 
have not spoken to the patients in order to confirm our suspicions that they really felt 
misunderstood and were disappointed in or angry with their doctors after their 
consultation. Although our research has illuminated some negative effects of clinical 
practice, studies show that patients are, in general, content with their medical 
encounters (Hjörleifsdóttir et al., 2010; Isaksen et al., 2003). It is clear that it would 
have been interesting to explore the patients’ expectations in their doctors and the 
health care system in order to interpret the course of the encounters we observed and 
the patients’ reactions. This shortcoming restricts the interpretation of our results and, 
in retrospect, would certainly be the lacuna that we would like to fill. 
 
Yet, there are methodological reasons why we did not pursue the patients’ 
perspectives. Initially, our focus was on the professionals. My research question dealt 
with the doctors’ tacit moral practice, and so we had to construct the study in order to 
investigate this. We could not know beforehand what part the patients would play in 
this investigation, and it was consistent with the approach of Grounded Theory to 
leave them out of the picture until they had earned their place in the emerging theory. 
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When we were offered the use of video-recorded data from patient consultations, we 
thought that this would deal with this issue to some extent. Indeed, in these 
recordings, we were able to observe the patients as much as the doctors and this gave 
us a better foundation for understanding the former’s participation. Nevertheless, 
omitting the patient from direct study continues to be an important limitation of our 




It is vital to acknowledge the effect of the researcher’s position and point of view on 
the results of a study. This is often referred to as reflexivity (Malterud, 2001). I have 
already revealed the interests and questions that initially led me into this research, 
and I am aware that this has affected my way of both collecting and interpreting the 
data. However, our preconceptions were a central gateway for our methodological 
decisions, which we have discussed in detail in the method section, and they need not 
be taken as a form of bias as long as they are disclosed. 
 
5.3.1. Conducting research in one’s own culture 
Another important issue in this work is that being a doctor myself, I am conducting 
research on a culture that I am already a part of. This is a topic that is thoroughly 
discussed in methodological literature (Wadel, 1991). In particular, there is a danger 
that a researcher is blind to certain aspects of a familiar situation, and there is also a 
risk that he or she feels a sense of companionship with the culture under study, which 
prevents a critical approach from being taken. As I have previously mentioned, I did 
at first have some problems when observing clinical situations in that I was “thinking 
as a doctor” and wondering about diagnoses and treatments. However, after some 
time in the field, and working explicitly on distancing myself from the role of the 
doctor, I felt I was more able to observe the ongoing processes independently of the 
medical content. I did feel sympathy for the doctors I observed, because I could 
recognise their problems and struggles, and I often admired how they handled 
difficult clinical situations. This may be seen as a defect in my observations, but it 
could also be taken as a deeper understanding of the working conditions of the 
professionals. Such signs of sympathy or comprehension is what I miss in many of 
the classic sociological studies of medical culture, where doctors are sometimes 
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portrayed in a very negative way which, in my view, exposes the fact that the 
observer has not understood what is at stake for the doctor. However, while I have 
sympathy and admiration for the doctors in our studies, I do not believe that this has 
hampered my ability to criticise them. Indeed, our descriptions of the doctors’ 
systematic existential neglect may appear harsh to many people, as illustrated by the 
critical response I received from several doctors. When it comes to discussing my 
identity as a doctor, I also believe that it is relevant that I am a junior doctor with 
modest clinical experience, and so my professional identity is perhaps not too firmly 
set in stone. Moreover, having a background in philosophy might also add to the 
reflexive detachment that is required for me to step out of my role as a doctor. All in 
all, I believe that my medical background has been necessary in order to conduct this 
research, and that it does not detract from our findings.  
 
The studies were a collaborative work with professionals from different fields, 
ensuring a more balanced assessment of the data. As my main supervisor was a 
philosopher, and my second supervisor an experienced doctor, we could approach the 
material from different perspectives, which complemented each other. This was 
particularly accentuated in the third study, where four different authors had access to 
the same data and yet achieved a common understanding of the interpretations 
thereof. Indeed, some could object that the group of observers was composed only of 
people with a certain interest in patient-doctor communication, and that this has 
biased our results. However, these potential biases are openly revealed and, as 
discussed in the methods section, it is often valuable with a certain previous 
knowledge in order to understand and penetrate into medical encounters. 
 
5.3.2. My presence at the scene 
My presence in the research setting must also be scrutinised. The fact that I was 
attending clinical consultations, which are normally strictly confined to patient and 
doctor, did certainly change the conditions of these encounters. This is an aspect of 
observational research that is hard to avoid. As I have explained earlier, I did try to 
intrude as little as possible by not recording the consultations, not taking notes when 
the patient was present and sitting quietly in a corner of the examination room. I was 
certainly not invisible or unnoticeable to the patients, but generally medical students 
and observing colleagues are a rather common intrusion in a medical encounter. 
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Since I followed each doctor over the course of a full day’s work, it did seem as if the 
professionals gradually became more familiar with my presence, and the reality was 
that I probably disturbed the patients more than their doctors. This was a benefit, as it 
was primarily the doctors’ behaviour that we were aiming to examine. The doctors 
were informed that I was conducting research in the field of medical ethics, and 
although many did not seem to have a clear grasp of what I was looking for, and very 
few asked for further details, I suspect that I did not observe the worst of their 
medical behaviour. Firstly, the doctors were probably more conscious of their 
actions, particularly their communication with patients, since they knew they were 
being observed, both in the first study and in the video-recorded data utilised for the 
third. Certainly, several times during the participant observation, the doctors would 
spend a lot of time on their first couple of patients and then become short of time and 
had to speed things up to a more normal pace. Secondly, I believe that the doctors in 
the first study who volunteered, or were volunteered by their superiors, were those 
who were known to have a good relationship with their patients. Indeed, in one 
particular department, some of the doctors kept hinting that I should have followed a 
certain colleague of theirs if I wanted to see some really interesting ethics, referring 
to this individual’s controversial style of patient communication. It was not, however, 
our intention to seek out the worst moral decisions or incidents of poor medical 
behaviour. Instead, we were aiming for the normal, everyday, unspectacular events 
and, if anything, we probably saw situations that were a cut above the ordinary, or we 
at least missed out on the worst cases. Despite this selection bias, it is interesting that 
the existential filtering was still so prominent, a fact that actually strengthens our 
conclusion. 
 
5.4. External validity 
So, to what other settings can our emerged theory reasonably be applied? This 
question relates to the external validity of the research, or what is sometimes referred 
to as the generalisability of the theory. 
 
5.4.1. Range of cases 
There were 17 doctor participants in our first study. Although this would be a small 
number in a quantitative piece of work, it is within the normal range for qualitative 
research. This is because the validity of the research relies partly on the depth of the 
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analysis, and using too many informants could easily lead to a superficial assessment 
(Malterud, 2001). It is also worth noting that it is not really the number of doctors 
that is interesting, since they are not the unit of analysis. Instead, in Grounded 
Theory, each incident is compared with similar incidents and with emerging 
concepts, meaning that the incident is the unit of analysis. There are several incidents 
per patient-doctor encounter, and the first study covered over a hundred 
consultations. In addition, we also conducted interviews and observations when 
patients were not present, such as during internal meetings and collaborations with 
colleagues, and these generated even more incidents. The total number of incidents 
was also considerable in the third study, which consisted of 101 patient encounters, 
each of which included several analysable incidents. The large number of cases does 
not, of course, in itself guarantee the external validity of our results, but they do at 
least indicate the magnitude of the collected material. 
 
5.4.2. Study population 
The doctors who were included in the first study came from three different general 
practitioners’ offices and five different hospital departments in three different 
hospitals. This was done to ensure the inclusion of a large range of doctors, patients 
and working environments. All of these settings were situated in Northern Norway, 
which may have caused a selection bias if these doctors differed from those in the rest 
of the country, but we have no reason to believe that this is the case. This possible 
selection issue might also have been mediated by the fact that several of the doctors 
came from other parts of the country, and had worked and graduated from 
universities from outside the area. Of course, the patients in Northern Norway may 
also not be representative of the whole country, because of regional cultural 
differences. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that these differences would affect our 
theory in any major way, especially since our focus is primarily on doctors’ 
behaviour. We would, therefore, expect our theory to be valid for how doctors work 
all over Norway, and possibly also across other Nordic countries because of their 
similar systems of health care. We cannot, however, transfer our theoretical analysis 
from the first and second studies directly to medical practice in other countries. This 
is because the conditions for medical work may differ in places which, for instance, 
have a more commercially based health care system, and further studies would be 
necessary to see how the theory fits into other environments and circumstances. 
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Another exception to our results would be in the realm of psychiatric health care, 
since we did not include this group in our data. In any event, I believe that the 
practice of psychiatric health care is sufficiently different from somatic medicine to 
require studies addressing this particular clinical field in order to assess how the 
theory applies to these encounters. 
 
The third study only included hospital doctors, and so these results should not be 
directly transferred to general practice. Many expect general practitioners to be more 
concerned with providing holistic care for their patients (Alment praktiserende lægers 
forening, 1978), and so further research would be needed to assess our division 
between courteousness and existential care in these settings. Nevertheless, our first 
study, which included general practitioners, did reveal the same process of 
essentialising for both this group and hospital doctors, indicating that the results of 
the third study might also be valid in general practice. 
 
5.4.3. Transferability of concepts 
What is vital for the external validity of a Grounded Theory is that the end product is 
not an empirical description, but an empirically based theory which can be transferred 
to settings other than the one being studied, provided the concepts fit the new 
environment. Our theory does not concern general practitioners’ consultations or 
patient communication in hospital departments. The theory of essentialising actually 
relates to general medical practice, and so is intended to apply to all medical work, in 
or out of hospitals and with or without patients. The concepts should be transferable 
to other areas wherein similar medical work is carried out. The theory may also be 
valid in other settings, for example in psychiatric care, but this must first be tested 
empirically. What is more, the theory is always open to modification in the light of 
new data, as previously described. Indeed, including new fields, like psychiatric 
health care or privatised medical practices, may introduce new and relevant data, 
which would alter the properties of some of the concepts, or restrict their range, while 
also widening the scope of the theory. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
My entry into this research project was a weekly teaching session at a local hospital 
and the nagging question: where did the ethics go? Through this persistent research 
process, I believe that the outlines of an answer are beginning to take shape. 
 
The practice of medicine seems to entail a certain way of handling patients which 
frees it from ordinary moral considerations. Accordingly, by easing the work of 
doctors and enabling them to handle patients in ways that one does not ordinarily deal 
with fellow human beings, the existential dimensions of humaneness are omitted 
from the picture or, are in some way, suspended. Doctors extract the medical facts 
and findings they need from a fellow human being and his or her ordinary accounts of 
illness, and turn them into a medical issue. When doctors speak in a manner that is 
difficult for the laity to understand, it is probably not only an issue of sporadic Latin 
wording, but also due to the fact that doctors’ interpretations are constructed around a 
strict medical understanding of human functions that is bereft of its ordinary, 
commonplace meaning. Having observed doctors’ systematic efforts to essentialise 
clinical situations, I am inclined to believe that this is an inevitable part of modern 
clinical practice, although we cannot infer this directly from our results. In view of 
what medical practice entails, with bodily examinations, surgical interventions and 
the probing of patients’ intimate and taboo issues, it seems evident that ordinary 
human interaction must be put aside for medical purposes. Learning how to deal with 
patients as objects seems to be an indispensable part of becoming a doctor. This is not 
only to protect the doctor from getting involved, and nor is it to protect patients from 
being invaded; the reality is that this approach is necessary for the application of 
basic medical knowledge. Depersonalising patients is a necessary part of succeeding 
as a doctor. 
 
Some readers might find this unduly provoking. Yet, I believe that it can only be 
regarded as such if you unconditionally accept large parts of particular, prescriptive 
medical ethics. Unfortunately, much of the literature on medical ethics has been 
written without proper attention being paid to the specific circumstances that 
constitute clinical practice and form the behaviour of doctors. Demanding that 
doctors engage personally and compassionately in the life of every suffering patient 
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is at best unwarranted. Such unattainable demands mask the preconditions of medical 
practice, and possibly contribute to doctors’ work-related discontent. To suspend the 
human dimension of the patient in order to contribute medically can be emotionally 
demanding. Being denounced for being inhumane makes the work exceedingly 
stressful. Studies on living conditions have shown that doctors are prone to work-
related frustration, which might be related to this inherent distress (Førde & Aasland, 
2008; Kälvemark et al., 2004). One of the important findings in our research is that 
the depersonalisation I speak of here is a systematic part of medical practice; it is not 
related to some personal quality or inadequacy of the doctors as individuals. 
 
Nonetheless, the problem of medical practice remains. Even if the depersonalising 
aspect of the medical encounter is inevitable, it still affects patients. Every patient 
will probably be exposed to the process of essentialising and hence reduced to an 
object or a mechanical body. At the core of the conception of morality and human 
dignity is the idea that individuals are not reducible to objects, but intrinsically 
valuable, and so reducing people to objects in this way is indeed a moral offence 
(Kant, 1998). While patients themselves might very well be prepared to acknowledge 
this reduction as a necessary part of medical treatment, it still affects them in ways 
that are inescapable. Even if it is an inevitable part of medical practice, doctors are 
morally responsible for this offence and its possible negative consequences, as the 
concept of moral residue has shed light on. “Non-maleficence” or “Primum non 
nocere” may thus be some of the least fitting principles in medicine. This is not only 
because medical treatment often entails potentially harmful interventions, but also 
because by merely entering the medical sphere, one is morally offended by being 
reduced to an object. In this respect, doctors’ courteousness could have an important 
function, as discerned in our third study. Our research revealed that doctors seemed to 
demonstrate human courtesy without noticing that they also objectified patients and 
overlooked their existential concerns, thus giving out mixed messages. Perhaps, if 
doctors were more aware of the process of essentialising, they could use their 
courteousness to repair their relationship with their patients. Acting respectfully is an 
important part of human interaction, and attending to the patient as a human being is 
even more important for doctors because of the inherent moral offence of medical 
practice. Doctors’ purposeful courteousness may be a way of restoring the ever-
challenged patient-doctor relationship. 
 105
Kari Milch Agledahl  Morally bound medical work 
 
A natural empirical continuation of this research would be to include the patient 
perspective, as previously discussed. The nature and magnitude of the moral offence 
caused by depersonalisation can only be assessed by asking patients. Furthermore, the 
contribution of patients can inform doctors of what improvements would lessen the 
potentially distressful experience. The concept of moral residue appears to be a useful 
theoretical approach to the problem, and an investigation of this concept could 
provide us with a better understanding of the moral offence and consequently of the 
doctors’ duties. Exploring the concept could lead to proliferation of ideas on how 
doctors could attend to the responsibilities of a moral residue. Moreover, I believe 
that the notion of inner morality is worth a further analysis, seeing that the notion is 
closely connected to how we understand medical practice as a profession. I would 
advocate to explore the consequences of how the premises of medical work, such as 
described by sociologists and anthropologists, have implications for medical ethics. I 
believe the field of medical ethics could profit from looking past the more mythical 
images of the patient and his doctor, in order to appreciate how clinical medicine is 
practiced in all its concreteness. 
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Study I: Information to doctors and patients 
 
Informasjon om forskningsprosjektet Klinikkens skjulte verdier 
 
 
 Målsetning: Prosjektet går ut på å synliggjøre legers etiske resonneringer og valg i vanlig klinisk 
arbeid. For å oppnå dette ønsker jeg å ta for meg legenes konkrete omgang med verdispørsmål i 
klinikken, for å se og høre hvordan de faktisk handler og beslutter i moralske problemstillinger. 
Jeg vil ikke vurdere legenes medisinske avgjørelser, og heller ikke evaluere legenes handlinger i 
forhold til moralsk rett og galt. Jeg ønsker å få tak i hva som ligger til grunn for legenes 
verdimessige resonnering. 
 
 Metode: Den planlagte studien går ut på å følge legers arbeidshverdag, i første omgang 
allmennlegene. Det vil si at jeg vil være med på morgenmøte, pasientkonsultasjoner, evt. 
kommunale oppgaver og tverrfaglige møter. I tillegg håper jeg legen har mulighet til å avsette 
tid til et 20-30min intervju på slutten av dagen. Intervjuet vil da i hovedsak dreie seg om dagens 
hendelser, og legen vil få mulighet til å utdype sine egne handlinger hvis ønskelig. 
 
 Taushetsplikt: Jeg er selv lege og vant til å forholde meg til taushetsbelagt informasjon. Som 
forsker har jeg imidlertid ikke tilgang til pasientdata ettersom jeg ikke er involvert i 
behandlingen av pasientene. Jeg vil derfor innhente samtykke av alle pasientene som kommer til 
konsultasjon hos den legen som observeres. Dersom pasienten ikke samtykker, vil jeg ikke være 
til stede i den aktuelle konsultasjonen. Jeg har ikke tilgang til pasientens journal utover 
opplysninger om den aktuelle problemstillingen. 
 
 Datainnsamling: Det vil ikke bli foretatt noen opptak av observasjoner eller intervju, registrering 
vil kun skje i form av notater underveis og etter observasjonen og intervjuet. For å forstyrre 
konsultasjonen minst mulig vil jeg unngå å ta notater når pasienten er tilstede. 
 
 Konfidensialitet: Jeg vil ikke nedtegne noen personidentifiserbare opplysninger om verken 
pasientene eller legene. Legene som observeres vil anonymiseres i materialet, og ikke være 
direkte eller indirekte identifiserbare i fremtidige artikler. 
 
 Prosjektets omfang: Studien av allmennlegenes kliniske hverdag er en del av en større studie 
hvor også sykehusleger inngår. I utgangspunktet er det planlagt observasjon og intervju med ca 
30 leger, men dette må avpasses i forhold til den fortløpende analysen av datamaterialet. Studien 
inngår i et doktorgradsprosjekt ved Universitetet i Tromsø og skal avsluttes vår 2010. 
 
 Finansiering: Prosjektet er finansiert av forskningsmidler fra Helse Nord. 
 
 Prosjektansvarlig: Undertegnede er prosjektansvarlig og ansvarlig for innsamling og behandling 
av data. Veileder for prosjektet er Åge Wifstad, førsteamanuensis ved ISM, UiT. Biveileder er 
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Tlf: 776 44811 (41 55 04 46) 
Forespørsel om samtykke 
 
 
Deltakelse i prosjektet er frivillig. Samtykket kan trekkes tilbake på et hvilket som helst 
tidspunkt uten å oppgi grunn. Dersom deltageren ønsker å få tilsendt fremtidige artikler 
publisert på bakgrunn av denne studien, må deltagerens navn og adresse registreres. 
Personinformasjonen vil ikke kunne knyttes til datainnsamlingen. 
 
 
Jeg har mottatt skriftlig og muntlig informasjon om 
prosjektet Klinikkens Skjulte Verdier. På grunnlag av dette 
er jeg villig til å delta i studien. 
 
 













Signatur:_____________________________________    Sted:_________    Dato:_____ 
 
 
Forespørsel om deltagelse i forskningsprosjektet 
Klinikkens Skjulte Verdier 
 
 
Dr ........................... deltar i dag i et forskningsprosjekt i medisinsk etikk. 
Det medfører at han blir fulgt gjennom hele arbeidsdagen av undertegnede, 
Kari Milch Agledahl, som selv er lege og forsker. Prosjektet fokuserer på de 
verdimessige sidene av medisinen, og målet er å synliggjøre hvordan leger 
faktisk håndterer verdispørsmål i arbeidet sitt. 
 
Ettersom du er pasient hos denne legen i dag, ønsker jeg om å be om tillatelse til 
å være til stede under legetimen. Jeg har taushetsplikt om alle 
pasientopplysninger, og ingen identifiserbar informasjon vil bli nedtegnet eller 
brukt i studien. Selv om du samtykker til studien, har jeg ikke tilgang til din 
pasientjournal. 
 
All deltakelse i prosjektet er frivillig. Dersom du ikke ønsker å delta i studien, 
vil legetimen forløpe som normalt, og det har ingen negative følger for deg som 
pasient. Selv om du samtykker til deltagelse, kan samtykket trekkes tilbake på et 
hvilket som helst tidspunkt uten at du trenger å oppgi grunn. 
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Informasjon om studien 
.  
 Målsetning: Prosjektet går ut på å synliggjøre legers etiske resonneringer og 
valg i vanlig klinisk arbeid. Fordi legers avgjørelser ofte har stor betydning for 
pasientenes liv og helse, er medisinske overveielser tett knyttet til 
verdivurderinger. Kjennskap til hvordan verdiene er infiltrert i medisinsk praksis 
kan bedre legenes forståelse av de etiske sidene av faget, og på denne måten 
hjelpe legene til å treffe kyndige medisinske avgjørelser og bli bedre leger. For å 
oppnå dette ønsker jeg å ta for meg legenes konkrete omgang med verdispørsmål i 
klinikken, for å se og høre hvordan de faktisk handler og beslutter i moralske 
problemstillinger. 
 
 Taushetsplikt: Jeg er selv lege og har vanlig taushetsplikt. Som forsker har 
jeg imidlertid ikke tilgang til informasjon om pasienter siden jeg ikke er involvert 
i den medisinske behandlingen. Alle pasientene som kommer til konsultasjon hos 
den legen som observeres blir derfor spurt om samtykke. For pasienter som 
samtykker har jeg ikke tilgang til pasientjournalen utover opplysninger om den 
aktuelle problemstillingen. Dersom pasienten ikke samtykker, vil jeg ikke være til 
stede i den aktuelle konsultasjonen.  
 
 Datainnsamling: Det vil ikke bli foretatt noen form for opptak av 
observasjoner, registrering vil kun skje i form av notater. For å forstyrre 
konsultasjonen minst mulig vil jeg unngå å ta notater når pasienten er tilstede. 
 
 Konfidensialitet: Jeg vil ikke notere eller bruke noen identifiserbare 
opplysninger om pasientene og legene. Legene og pasientene som observeres vil 
bli fullt anonymisert i fremstillingen av studien. 
 
 Prosjektets omfang: I utgangspunktet er det planlagt observasjon og intervju 
med ca 30 leger. Studien inngår i et doktorgradsprosjekt ved Universitetet i 
Tromsø som skal avsluttes våren 2010. 
 
 Finansiering: Prosjektet er finansiert av forskningsmidler fra Helse Nord. 
 
 Prosjektansvarlig: Undertegnede er prosjektansvarlig og ansvarlig for 
innsamling og behandling av data. Veileder for prosjektet er Åge Wifstad, 
førsteamanuensis ved Institutt for Samfunnsvitenskap, Universitetet i Tromsø. 
Biveileder er Reidun Førde, professor II ved seksjon for medisinsk etikk, 
Universitetet i Oslo. 
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Medisinsk avdeling deltar denne uken i et forskningsprosjekt i medisinsk etikk. 
På grunn av dette følges Dr ..................... gjennom arbeidsdagen i dag av 
undertegnede som selv er lege og forsker. 
 
Siden du er pasient hos denne legen i dag, ønsker jeg om å be om tillatelse til å 
være til stede under legetimen. Hvis du ikke ønsker min tilstedeværelse, har det 
ingen negative følger for deg som pasient. Selv om du samtykker nå, kan du 
ombestemme deg når som helst uten at du trenger å oppgi grunn. 
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jeg imidlertid ikke tilgang til informasjon om pasienter siden jeg ikke er involvert 
i den medisinske behandlingen. Alle pasientene som kommer til konsultasjon hos 
den legen som observeres blir derfor spurt om samtykke. For pasienter som 
samtykker har jeg ikke tilgang til pasientjournalen utover opplysninger om den 
aktuelle problemstillingen. Dersom pasienten ikke samtykker, vil jeg ikke være til 
stede i den aktuelle konsultasjonen.  
 
 Datainnsamling: Det vil ikke bli foretatt noen form for opptak av 
observasjoner, registrering vil kun skje i form av notater. For å forstyrre 
konsultasjonen minst mulig vil jeg unngå å ta notater når pasienten er tilstede. 
 
 Konfidensialitet: Jeg vil ikke notere eller bruke noen identifiserbare 
opplysninger om pasientene og legene. Legene og pasientene som observeres vil 
bli fullt anonymisert i fremstillingen av studien. 
 
 Prosjektets omfang: I utgangspunktet er det planlagt observasjon og intervju 
med ca 30 leger. Studien inngår i et doktorgradsprosjekt ved Universitetet i 
Tromsø som skal avsluttes våren 2010. 
 
 Finansiering: Prosjektet er finansiert av forskningsmidler fra Helse Nord. 
 
 Prosjektansvarlig: Undertegnede er prosjektansvarlig og ansvarlig for 
innsamling og behandling av data. Veileder for prosjektet er Åge Wifstad, 
førsteamanuensis ved Institutt for Samfunnsvitenskap, Universitetet i Tromsø. 
Biveileder er Reidun Førde, professor II ved seksjon for medisinsk etikk, 
Universitetet i Oslo. 
 
 




Medisinsk avdeling deltar denne uken 
(uke 12) i et forskningsprosjekt i 
medisinsk etikk. Enkelte av legene ved 
avdelingen vil derfor bli fulgt av         
Kari Milch Agledahl, som selv er lege og 
forsker. Studien fokuserer på legene og 
deres arbeid og ikke primært på 
pasientene, men du som pasient vil også 
kunne bli observert hvis du er i kontakt 
med legen som følges den arbeidsdagen. 
Det vil imidlertid ikke bli brukt noen 
identifiserbare opplysninger om deg som 
pasient. Hvis du ønsker det, kan du 
reservere deg mot å bli observert i 
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Study II: Information to doctors and patients 
 
Erklæring om samtykke – leger 
 
 
Undersøkelse av kvaliteten på legers samtale med pasienter 
 
 
Jeg har lest skriftlig informasjon og fått muntlig informasjon om undersøkelsen som handler 
om hvordan kvaliteten på legers samtale med pasienter kan forbedres. Jeg godtar at mine 
konsultasjoner videofilmes som ledd i dette forskningsprosjektet, så fremt pasienten har avgitt 
informert samtykke. 
 
Jeg er kjent med at jeg når som helst kan trekke tilbake mitt samtykke til oppbevaring av 
videoopptakene. Jeg er videre kjent med at videoopptakene kun vil bli brukt til forskning på 
kommunikasjon mellom leger og pasienter, og at jeg og involvert(e) pasient(er) vil bli 
kontaktet for ev. å avgi samtykke til bruk av et videoopptak i forbindelse med undervisning av 
leger eller medisinstudenter dersom det blir aktuelt. 
‪ Jeg gir samtykke til at videoopptakene lagres ved Universitetet i Oslo til bruk for 
forskning på kommunikasjon mellom leger og pasienter til og med år 2020. Ev. nye 
prosjekter vil bli vurdert av Regional komité for medisinsk forskningsetikk. 
‪ Jeg gir kun samtykke til at videoopptakene lagres ved Universitetet i Oslo til bruk for 
det aktuelle prosjektet, der effekten av et kurs i klinisk kommunikasjon skal vurderes, 
dvs. lagring til og med år 2011. 
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